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Abstract 
 
Every U.S. President has maintained and crafted a prescriptive set of policies with which they 
conduct international affairs. All Presidents have left their historical mark- what they believe to 
be America’s position in the world, and its commensurate role. After the fall of the Berlin Wall, 
the world transformed as America achieved international hegemony as the sole superpower and 
subsequent victor of the Cold War. However, many today question U.S. primacy shifting the 
debate toward questioning if and how America should act in the world.  
 
Barack Obama’s foreign policy eludes the confines of a single political ideology and philosophy. 
After being elected President, Barack Obama was bequeathed several entrenched problems (e.g. 
the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, the Great Recession), and encountered new ones along the way 
(e.g. the Libyan intervention, Arab uprisings).  
 
A rhetorical analysis of his major speeches, beginning with several of his campaign speeches and 
ending at the present time, elucidates that his foreign policy is largely shaped by three major 
International Relations philosophical frameworks. This Capstone thesis contends that Obama’s 
rhetoric- i.e. speeches, foreign policy writings, books, addresses, and educational background- 
about America’s position and subsequent role in the world today indicates that his foreign policy 
is a combination of Liberal Internationalism, Constructivism, and Institutionalism (LICI). They 
have overlapping features that reaffirm each other's validity, and all are substantiated further by 
several subcategories.  
 
The subcategories this paper draws upon to illustrate how Obama’s rhetoric reflects and, in many 
ways, constructs his foreign policy are: Pragmatism, Progressivism, Cosmopolitanism, Soft-
power and global engagement, and multilateralism. Obama’s rhetoric is indicative of what he 
believes America’s role in the world could be, and should be.  
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Advice to Future Honors Students 
  
The Capstone project has been surprisingly revelatory. It was formative and gratifying, 
not just for what was produced, but what was learned along the way. Please choose something 
you love, something that opens your eyes in the morning grogginess and quickens your pace on 
your commute; because, I think, you’ll probably derive more meaning from your efforts. 
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Words are important, words matter, and the implication that they don't, I think, diminishes how 
important it is to speak to the American people directly about making America as good as its 
promise.  
—Barack Obama, February 21, 2008 
What is the Obama Doctrine? And Where is the US Headed in the World? 
 
Introduction and Background 
 
January 20, 2009 
  
On this wintry day in Washington D.C., the United States of America witnessed the inauguration 
of its first black president. At 48 years old, Barack Hussein Obama II, a Constitutional law 
professor and one-half term serving Senator from Illinois, was elected to the highest office in 
America. Pundits and commentators alike could not choose between their elations: George W. 
Bush’s long awaited exit, or Barack Obama’s imminent arrival. Regardless of the validity of 
their lamentations regarding the years between 2001 and 2008, commentators on virtually all 
sides of the spectrum were confronted with exactly what Obama campaigned on: “Change.” The 
election itself, which took place on November 4th, 2008, saw a turnout of 131 million voters (out 
of a registered 146 million people) - roughly 64 percent of the age-eligible voting population. Of 
the total voters, self-identified “Blacks” and “Hispanics” provided record voting turnouts with 
their highest levels of all time. In 2008, the voting rate for non-Hispanic Whites was lower than 
in 2004, but higher than 2000 or 1996. Citizens aged 18-24 were the group most significantly 
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present with 49 percent having voted, thus constituting 12.5 percent of the total vote. Older 
groups decreased, but negligibly.1  
 Many writers around the world began speculating on the implications of what some 
authors penned as the “Obama effect.” Some scholars- who even referred to his political 
presence as “a positive counter-stereotypic exemplar,”- conducted an NSF-funded psychological 
research project that concluded that explicit and consistent exposure to Obama had resulted in a 
widespread “decrease in implicit anti-Black prejudice among non-Black voters.” The study goes 
on to state further: “After exposure to negative exemplars, participants responded with 
heightened levels of anti-Black implicit prejudice more akin to pre-Obama levels of prejudice.”2 
Hendrik Hertzberg of The New Yorker’s definition of the “Obama effect” (with which he credits 
the surprising 2009 Lebanese parliamentary upsets where a moderate coalition of “pro-
American” and “pro-Western” parties precluded Hezbollah from gaining control) was not so 
much of a definition as it was a feeling or a sentiment interpreted by writers like himself. He 
described Obama’s 2009 Cairo speech as an example of a “carefully constructed edifice of public 
diplomacy,” containing ‘cathartic’ elements of both of a “university lecture” and a 
“psychoanalytic session” that said aloud many things that were left unsaid- a statement that may 
be extrapolated and attributed to the whole swath of political writers. “A new mood,” Hertzberg 
defended Obama as having created, “is a prerequisite to progress.”3  
 Interpretive writers aside, public mood around the world did, in fact, change. According 
to a BBC World Poll, 15 out of 17 nations polled had averages of 67 percent of respondents 
believed that the election of Barack Obama would lead to improved relations around the globe. 
Steve Kull, Director of the Program on International Policy Attitudes presciently stated that 
“Familiarity with Obama seems to be breeding hope… But then again, he is starting from a low 
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baseline, following eight years of an unpopular US president.  Maintaining this enthusiasm will 
be a challenge given the complexities he now faces.”4 The New York Times weekly contributor 
Nicholas Kristof wrote with trepidation about the expectations bestowed upon Obama: 
“Substance should always trump symbolism.” He then concluded that “if this election goes as the 
polls suggest, we may find a path to restore America’s global influence — and thus to achieve 
some of our international objectives — in part because the world is concluding that Americans 
can, after all, see beyond a person’s epidermis.”5 However, a 2009 WorldPublicOpinion.org poll 
found that although Barack Obama’s popularity soared abroad, many countries still remained 
skeptical and cynical about the United States’ foreign policy objectives and motivations. Many 
majorities in various countries around the world- both Western and non-Western, still maintained 
that the US coercively manipulates other countries by using its military might and prominent 
position of power.6 Taking office after eight years of an extremely unpopular presidency, Obama 
inherited a global disposition that reflected a decade-long-war-fatigued, world-weary cynicism 
that was exacerbated by the roiling of the financial markets that would come to define the Obama 
presidency and current reelection campaign. 
 Noting the changing domestic and international mood, Craig Hayden wrote that Obama’s 
early onslaught of international public diplomacy, as both a communication strategy and foreign 
policy imperative, was both “pivotal” and “energizing.” Acutely capturing and summarizing the 
remedial sense of Obama’s election, Hayden writes:  
 
The Obama presidency symbolized a significant transition from the 
Bush administration and heralded the prospect of a more engaged 
global leader sensitive to public opinion and the historical 
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concerns of publics outside the United States. This expectation of 
change, encouraged and cultivated in campaign rhetoric and 
expressed in journalistic outlets around the world, expressed both 
a challenge to the foreign policy values perceived as intrinsic in 
the Bush administration’s actions as much as revealed a 
wellspring of sentiment towards the possibilities of an Obama 
presidency. Put simply, the Obama election evidenced a latent 
potential for U.S. soft power catalyzed by the symbolic significance 
of the candidate. The ensuing months following the inauguration of 
Barack Obama, however, revealed concerns about the ability of a 
president to carry the supposed burdens of public diplomacy alone. 
 
 The imagery of an America on bended knee accurately depicts of the way in which 
Barack Obama entered his presidency; he and many other scholars considered his election a 
curative- a referendum on what many perceived as a self-interested United States unmindful of 
international opinion. Obama’s campaign rhetoric rehashed notions of Woodrow Wilson’s ideas 
of American support for self-determination and sovereignty of all nation-states. As Hayden 
suggests, “the narratives of hope and struggle expressed about the Obama administration in its 
first year are implicit arguments for an invigorated public diplomacy.”7  
 Regardless of one’s political orientation, it has become obvious that Obama’s rhetoric 
and major campaigning efforts contained, as writer James Wolcott noted, “a salvational fervor;” 
an “idealistic zeal divorced from any particular policy or cause and chariot-driven by pure 
euphoria.”8 Many political writers continue to critique Obama for his policy initiatives like the 
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vaunted Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, wryly coined “Obamacare.” But while his 
domestic policies have garnered him great amounts of criticism, his global perspective and vision 
of America continues to vex commentators and scholars alike. 
 While Conservative writers continue to harp on Obama’s “liberalism” (George Will 
wrote: “After blaming his predecessor for this and that… after firing all the arrows in 
liberalism’s quiver…”), many commentators on the left also continue to berate Obama for not 
having fulfilled enough of his campaign’s international pledges to the left.9 Despite the political 
tug-of-war between the commentators and skeptics, Obama’s vision has undergone a lot of 
scrutiny within the first two years of his presidency. Although he has completed many tasks 
abroad he campaigned on, and many others, his detractors admonish him for a plethora of 
different reasons and problems.  
Has Obama’s vision of what America’s role in the world should be changed so drastically 
that the country would rally around a reactionary response as a form of retaliation? While writers 
like Charles Krauthammer continue to castigate Obama for “dithering” on global issues like 
Libya -“leading from behind”10 as The New Yorker political writer Ryan Lizza describes the 
president’s command over the Libyan intervention- many scholars continue to commend Obama 
for his global participation and collaborative willingness. His many overseas trips, swift 
rhetorical ease on post-partisanship, and articulation of a “new world order,”11 have turned 
Obama into a Nobel Peace Prize winner and a conservative piñata for writers like ex-U.N. 
Ambassador John Bolton who have labeled Obama as America’s first “post-American 
President.”12 
In 2006, the near-twilight of Bush’s presidential tenure, scholars and historians wrote 
about the negative ramifications of said administration’s foreign policy blunders and/or mistakes. 
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Princeton historian Sean Willentz wrote in Rolling Stone that George W. Bush was on the verge 
of earning the title of “one of the worst presidents in US history,” claiming that his presidency 
appeared “headed toward colossal disgrace.”13 In 2009 author Sam Tanenhaus wrote a book 
entitled “The Death of Conservatism.” David S. Mason in “The End of the American Century” (a 
title rehashing Henry Luce’s pronouncement of the Twentieth Century) writes pessimistically 
(not to say almost eschatologically) that: 
  
Almost everywhere in the world now, including among populations 
of our closest allies, the influence of U.S. politics, economics, and 
culture is seen as a threat to peace, harmony, and national 
identity. The U.S. invasion of Iraq, in blatant disregard of both 
international law and the United Nations, extended that perception 
to America’s military as well and intensified anti-Americanism all 
around the globe. The American Century has clearly come to an 
end.14 
Professor Wilentz reminds us that no historian can responsibly predict the future on account of 
innumerable imponderables, and as such, one is left with more questions at this juncture 
regarding Obama’s foreign policy trajectory than ever. Clearly anti-Bush and anti-
Republican/Conservative sentiments played an enormous role in Obama’s 2008 election, but has 
the situation reversed since then? Scholars like William Galston of the Brookings Institution 
wrote that although Obama may be unfairly blamed for that which he has not caused- i.e. the 
international economic downturn15- it is no longer plausible nor credible to simply write off the 
Conservative populism (e.g. the federated matrix known as the Tea Party) and the November 
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2010 election as a referendum on internal ‘Leftist’ policies, and/or liberalism alone, to which so 
many Conservative commentators and writers attributed it. 
 This is due, in part, to the fact that Obama shares more with his predecessor than many 
would care to believe. Regarding his foreign policy, and the potential nostalgia for Bush, 
Stephen Walt in Foreign Policy wrote: “Obama's efforts to clean up Bush's legacy may have 
been disappointing so far, but that's no reason to feel nostalgic for the man who created all these 
messes in the first place.”16 
 What then, is the state of America in the world today? Presupposing a need for an 
American ‘role’, many political scholars seek to answer such a question; and such is the focus of 
this paper. 
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Purpose 
 
This essay will attempt to synthesize and interpret through rhetorical analysis, the vision 
of America Obama has propounded, and the foreign policy philosophies that have influenced his 
political output. By analyzing Obama’s major foreign policy speeches and writings, we may 
better understand his view of what America’s role in the world could be and should be. 
Beginning with the latter part of his 2008 campaign and his inaugural address, I will highlight 
the main points and phrases that I think Obama seeks to incorporate in his vision of America’s 
international role. Aside from focusing on Obama’s speeches, I will also incorporate many of his 
policies and initiatives taken while in office. 
Barack Obama’s foreign policy may be interpreted as an attempt at consolidating the 
International Relations theories of Liberal Internationalism, Constructivism, and Liberal 
Institutionalism. These three theoretical frameworks have been largely substantiated by both 
Obama’s policy initiatives and rhetoric. Although many commentators have derided Obama’s 
foreign policy doctrine as being inchoate, or even nonexistent, Obama has repeatedly proven to 
be grounded in viewing the United States of America as a willing participant in the “international 
community.” It is precisely that Barack Obama may be more unwilling to act unilaterally that has 
shaped the growing body of political commentary that characterize his foreign policy 
competency as both inexperienced and naïve. 
 Disclaimer. There have been obvious instances where President Obama has passed 
policies and given speeches that contradict my central thesis and its derivative ideas. The first 
thing to note, and should not have to be reminded that he is a politician. His policies and 
speeches may not always align with this paper’s following position. Second, this paper does not 
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address whether his foreign policy rhetoric/policies/agenda have succeeded, but rather what they 
are, and how they can be interpreted through International Relations theory. As an ex-college 
professor, author of two books, a lawyer, and a community organizer, that President Obama 
considers and appreciates the gravity of words is indubitable.  
 I will first outline the three main International Relations theories that Obama has 
portrayed through his rhetoric. I will then provide several thematic subcategories I believe derive 
and constitute the foreign policy web that Obama has created through his rhetoric and initiatives. 
His personal philosophy, education, and policy initiatives manifest themselves through his 
choice of words and actions and result in what I refer to as the Obama Doctrine. The speeches 
and writings that will be used are ones delivered both during and after his campaign. I will 
explain later the way in which I believe that Obama’s rhetoric is an attempt at consolidating the 
three I.R. philosophies- with five central tenets that each contribute to the three (in no particular 
order): multilateralism, soft-power/engagement, Cosmopolitanism, Pragmatism and 
progressivism (the last two as evidenced through his formative years and governing experience). 
All of these combined make up what I will refer to hereafter as The Obama Doctrine, the LICI 
foreign policy, etc.  
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Prolegomena: International Relations Theory  
 
Liberal Internationalism- Normative 
 
Before beginning, it is extremely important to outline some of the key features 
comprising these theoretical frameworks. Liberal Internationalism has its roots in America in the 
early twentieth century. Woodrow Wilson’s vision of “self-determination” of nation-states to 
govern themselves, making the world “safe for democracy,” mesh with Kantian notions of 
democratic peace theory. The democratic peace theory is the idea that nations with representative 
governing bodies are less likely to go to war with one another. Born out of these, according to 
writer Michael Lind, “The ideal of liberal internationalism therefore is a world organized as a 
peaceful global society of sovereign, self-governing peoples, in which the great powers, rather 
than compete to carve out rival spheres of influence, cooperate to preserve international peace in 
the face of threats from aggressive states and terrorism.”17 Contrary to the values and claims 
made by isolationism, realism, and non-interventionism, Liberal Internationalism (often derided 
as ‘liberal interventionism’) seeks to make full and thorough use of supranational organizations, 
like the U.N., before becoming involved in foreign affairs. The U.N.’s founding charter is 
generally regarded as the archetypal agreement delineating the typical values of Liberal 
Internationalism: global human rights, multilateralism, the primacy of diplomatic litigation, 
international peace/security, and cooperative multipolarity. It is important to note that although 
‘liberal’ is a term often applied to Democrats and Leftists, Liberal Internationalism has never 
been specific to one political ideology. Albeit highly militarized, George W. Bush was often 
described as employing such a foreign policy (“armed Wilsonians”). 
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In an essay entitled Liberal Internationalism, John MacMillan writes: “Within liberalism 
persons are not only the subject of moral discourse, but also regarded as key agents of historical 
and political change.” Clearly, this notion overlaps with the next IR theoretical framework. But 
MacMillan makes the point that despite many contradictions and limits, Liberal Internationalism 
should not “operate as it has in the past: grounded in an ethnocentric mode of thought that 
justifies universal moral and political claims from within its own particular philosophical 
discourse.” He further contends that at the normative level, liberalism benefits from the espousal 
of the principle of equality and civilizations, that the advocating of human rights and democracy 
as core universal values should remain at the top of the Liberal Internationalist structure; 
however, it should also be weary of self-referentiality, that is to say, skeptical of who and what 
formulates and interprets the content of human rights. Finally, MacMillan concludes: 
“Mainstream foreign policy debate in the United States is divided not over the question of 
American leadership, but over the question of whether this be unilateral or multilateral in 
character. That the latter in practice places greater emphasis upon ‘soft-power’ dovetails with 
traditional liberal internationalist approaches.”18 While often paired with Realism, Obama’s 
foreign policy significantly sways away from Realist assumptions and values. (These generally 
include, but are not limited to: an anarchic and antagonistic world with competing nation-states, 
incorrigible human imperfection, self-aggrandizement, balances of power, and the supremacy of 
states’ survival.) The debate about unilateralism versus multilateralism gets a lot of play when 
analyzing the Obama presidency as compared to the Bush’s. 
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Constructivism- Descriptive 
 
Constructivism, as an IR theory, also places international cooperation and peace as its top 
values, but emphasizes different aspects of global affairs. That international relations is largely a 
social construction shaped by rhetoric, human nature, history, and culture is the definitive 
precept underlying Constructivism. It also highlights several other salient themes. First, 
Constructivism places emphasis on social construction’s differences across borders (i.e. 
respective histories, cultures, languages, etc.), as opposed to a single historical Truths. 
Constructivism may be regarded as underlining more subjectivity and contingencies in its 
various explanations than its competing theories. Through processes of interaction, 
Constructivists argue, inter-state actors cooperatively engage in rhetoric and acts of 
performativity, whereby international politics becomes ‘a world of our making.’19 Instead of 
viewing the limitations of structural constraints, Constructivism stresses ‘norms’ and ‘shared 
understandings.’ 
While Constructivism may ostensibly be at bipolar odds with Liberal Internationalism, J. 
Samuel Barkin puts the argument differently to show how it is not so. Drawing upon the implicit 
methodological and ontological considerations of Constructivism, two aspects are most salient: 
intersubjectivity and co-constitution. Intersubjectivity, as Jennifer-Sterling Folker puts it, is 
defined as “collective knowledge and understandings.”20 Or as Emanuel Adler puts it, 
“knowledge that persists beyond the lives of individual social actors, embedded in social routines 
and practices as they are reproduced by interpreters who participate in their production and 
workings.”21 Tacitly found within this concept of intersubjectivity is the assumption that there 
are, in fact, ideas and understandings commonly shared amongst peoples of all nations. The 
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second consideration, co-constitution, is defined as “people and society construct, or constitute, 
each other.” Barkin asserts that neither one is given ontological superiority, but rather viewed as 
being mutually constitutive.20 Inter-subjectivity does not imply subjectivity, as it is possible to 
intersubjectively understand Objective reality. 
K.M. Fierke writes that the “main point” of Constructivism theory “is that academic 
debate, no less than political, emerges in historically and culturally specific circumstances.” That 
this philosophical theory emphasizes interaction and diplomacy between civilizations, nations, 
peoples, there can be no doubt. Construstivism, Fierke argues, has been seen as being the 
‘middle ground’ between the rationalist and poststructuralist schools of IR. Constructivism, as it 
translates into the policy arena of politics, would logically result in a more nuanced and 
deliberate consideration of speech acts, and the primacy of international diplomacy. Clearly 
certain norms, understandings, paradigms, and truths change over time with progress and human 
interaction. As Wittgenstein showed, language is not solely a mirror for which human actions 
and words are reflected, but rather a world in and of themselves. As some Constructivists have 
grounded their analyses in epistemological positivism, legitimating many of their claims, 
Constructivism’s emphasis on causality, hypothesis testing, results in political policies that 
attempt to be as expository and explanatory as possible. Obama’s superlative dedication to 
answering ‘how and why,’ and the ‘how possible’ questions that arise from distinct conflicts and 
circumstances (i.e. the Iraq war, the 2008 financial collapse) does not stem from his 
determination to identify ‘true’ causes, but rather the Constructivist style way of finding out the 
social causes and facts that brought them about. This elucidates the fragility and importance, 
both of which Obama recognizes, of public dialogue. Finally, engaging in public dialogue 
through speeches and addresses plays an international role as important as it is befuddling. 
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Trying to deconstruct the rhetoric of political speeches delivered abroad can be a bedeviling 
hermeneutical inquiry, the likes of which would take hundreds of pages to unpack. This essay 
focuses more on what is said, rather than what is implied. 
 
Institutionalism- Performative 
  
Institutionalism is another aspect of IR theory that holds that through an international 
cooperative framework, peace can be better established and thus maintained. With its historical 
roots in the inception of the supranational League of Nations of 1919, Institutionalism is based 
on the precept that Collective Security can best be established through voluntary and cooperative 
institutions such as NGOs, and non-profits. Although international cooperation, as scholar 
Robert Keohane posits, does not necessarily imply common or shared motives, values, and 
causes.22 Therefore, it becomes important to qualify the term “Institution” as specific -- 
established intercessors to which collective power, resources, and processes are delegated. 
Utilizing international institutions to address meta-challenges has been seen through NATO, the 
U.N., and the Red Cross. Oftentimes, as is the case with the United Nations, many of the existent 
international institutions are founded upon internationally agreed-upon charters, treatises, and 
treaties. One may conclude, however, that this is not anathema to the Realist precept of an 
anarchic global order with no overarching supervisory power, but that applying institutional 
frameworks like NGOs, conflict (and the Realist idea of self-aggrandizement) may be prevented. 
Institutionalism, as just defined, is somewhat antithetical to unilateralism. 
 (Despite not being the focus of this paper, the what-came-first-the-chicken-or-the-egg 
argument between multilateralism and institutionalism is a perennial one. For the sake of this 
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essay, let it be assumed that each facilitates the other, and both mutually reaffirm each other’s 
need.) 
 
 
The Obama Doctrine Elucidated Through Rhetoric 
  
 As seen in the diagram below, I have outlined several major areas in which Barack 
Obama has couched the conduct of his foreign policy. If Liberal Internationalism is the 
normative aspect, Constructivism the descriptive, and Institutionalism the performative, then his 
rhetoric is an attempt at reconciling and harmonizing these theories and practices, as well as their 
resultant categorical imperatives. Largely reparative in style, Obama’s rhetoric has defied one 
political doctrine and encompasses the ones outlined here. While none of the subcategories I will 
extrapolate on are mutually exclusive, the diagram below shows the way in which Obama’s three 
major I.R.-theories manifest themselves in both rhetoric and policies. This will ultimately lead to 
the following questions: Is Barack Obama’s rhetoric indicative of his preconceived foreign 
policy conceptions? Or, does the foreign policy he employs reflect the rhetoric he has used in 
speeches? What is the connection between the three International Relations theories and the 
rhetoric he employs? And, what is the relationship between the three theories and the 
subcategories I have chosen and described later? 
 First, I believe that the rhetoric and his policies are mutually constitutive. The same goes 
for his rhetoric and philosophical beliefs regarding global politics. From my analyses later in this 
paper, I have drawn my own conclusions as to how all the ideas presented here fit together. 
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 To avoid this paper becoming too nebulous, I will outline here how all of this ‘fits 
together.’ First, as previously stated, Obama’s rhetoric is reflective of the way in which he sees 
the world (Constructivist). It’s also reflective of the normative framework he ascribes to (Liberal 
internationalism) and the performative way in which he finds it most facile to achieve 
(Institutionalism). From these overarching frameworks, I have deduced that the personal 
philosophy Obama himself embodies most clearly is Cosmopolitanism. Given his background 
before the presidency, we start to see the influences Columbia University, Chicago-based 
community organization, and Harvard Law School had on him- resulting in Progressivism and 
Pragmatism. Throughout his first two years as president, his foreign policy has most profoundly 
displayed: multilateralism, soft power, and global engagement. His Pragmatism with regard to 
foreign policy situates itself (at least rhetorically) in between the descriptive and the 
performative- i.e. Constructivism and Institutionalism. Similarly, his Progressivism finds itself as 
a reconciliation between the normative and the performative, or Liberal Internationalism and 
Institutionalism. Then, as shown in the diagram, these all overlap resulting in a rhetoric that 
reflects both the way he sees the world, and the position America maintains within said world. 
 In the diagram below, and in practice, Obama’s foreign policies are not always consonant 
with the outline I have described, nor do they always match the rhetoric and vice versa. The way 
in which I go about explaining these issues is through extrapolation. That is to say, I have posited 
what I believe to be the three salient I.R. theories that compose the Obama Doctrine; I have also 
identified several thematic and political subcategories that make up the three frameworks. 
Epistemologically, I go about verifying and showing these assertions to be true through his 
rhetoric and several of the most illustrative policies that show my thesis to be true. Much of 
Barack Obama’s rhetoric, I contend, promulgates a vision of the world not as something totally 
23 
 
new, but rather different for that of a U.S. president to promote. 
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The Speeches 
 
Candidacy and Pre-Presidency 
  
While it is no secret that political speeches tend, more often than not, to be anodyne and 
circumspect, it is in fact possible to rhetorically analyze (chronologically) several of the major 
speeches given by a political figure in order to parse out major trends and themes. While trying 
to tease out much of the partisan populist vote-getting assertions designed to attract voters, it 
becomes clear that the four aforementioned frameworks influence Barack Obama’s foreign 
policy standpoint, or ‘Doctrine.’ Obviously, pre-written speech transcripts are deliberate and 
calculated with a certain prescribed motive; therefore, many off-the-cuff remarks, such as 
responses to questions from audience members and the press, may be more elucidating, thus 
providing further insight into a politician’s personal philosophical disposition.  
Kevin Coe and Michael Rietzes write: “The campaign rhetoric of winning presidential 
candidates matters once they take office. As Quirk and Matheson point out, such rhetoric ‘creates 
commitments that carry weight after the election’ (2005, 133), expanding or limiting the ability 
of presidents to govern effectively.”23 
President Obama declared his presidential candidacy on February 10th, 2007. Beginning 
with this date becomes important because it signifies Obama’s nascent conceptualization of his 
future foreign policy outlook. 2,603 words long, his candidacy speech delivered in Springfield, 
Illinois is largely bereft of a nuanced foreign policy agenda, however, he does make mention of 
certain topics that are characteristic of both Liberal Internationalism and Constructivism. Aside 
from the Eric Hoffer-esque idealistic promise of a better, more prosperous tomorrow (“ending 
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poverty in America,” “freeing ourselves from the tyranny of oil,” “universal health care”)24 he 
alludes to the successes of war and security as being one of collective and shared responsibility. 
The first mention he makes of what appears to be his foreign policy viewpoints, come when he 
states: “Let’s…confront the terrorists with everything we've got.” Obama then continues with: 
“We can work together to track terrorists down with a stronger military, we can tighten the net 
around their finances, and we can improve our intelligence capabilities. But let us also 
understand that ultimate victory against our enemies will come only by rebuilding our alliances 
and exporting those ideals that bring hope and opportunity to millions around the globe.” Foreign 
political inclusivity abounds throughout many of Obama’s speeches and can be seen here. 
Themes of Liberal Internationalism and Constructivism are obvious here with repetition of “we” 
(ostensibly pertaining to Americans), “work together,” “rebuilding alliances,” and “exporting 
those ideals,” may all be viewed as commensurate with a Liberal Internationalist approach 
reminiscent of Woodrow Wilson’s idealism that sought to export American ideals- ‘making the 
world safe for democracy.’ Obama’s call for “rebuilding alliances” within the context of 
“confronting the terrorists” may be viewed as a tacit approval of plurality in state action. One 
may further argue that when Obama spoke of “exporting those ideals that bring hope and 
opportunity” (italics mine), he purposely used these words in order to account for discrepant 
political regimes that may not acquiesce to an American presence or influence. 
To this end, Obama goes on in the speech to contradict himself. As time, future speeches, 
and actions will prove, he cannot commit to what are contradictory condemnations of 
interventionism referenced in his candidacy speech. Calling for an end to the “tragic mistake” of 
the Iraq War, he states: “It's time to admit that no amount of American lives can resolve the 
political disagreement that lies at the heart of someone else's civil war.” Because of retrospective 
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analyses of his political speeches (e.g. Nobel acceptance speech) and policies (e.g. Libyan 
intervention), this denunciation of interventionism may be viewed as “epideictic” rhetoric, rather 
than “deliberative” rhetoric.  
An epideictic, or ceremonial, style of rhetoric is one of three styles (the third being 
“forensic”) that strategically seeks to inject both praise and blame into a speech. As Coe and 
Reitzes report in their study of Obama’s campaign rhetoric, presidential candidates develop 
thematic appeals that become more epideictic than direct so as to not pigeonhole themselves on 
issues. However, they identified five major Policy Appeals for which he actually proffered 
specific proposals: economy, national security, healthcare, the environment, and education.23 
Examples of Obama’s use of epideictic rhetoric to remonstrate the previous administration’s 
unilateralism and unipolarity are copious, and demonstrably elucidate many policy and rhetorical 
contradictions. 
 
Obama’s Personal Background and Philosophical Rearing 
  
Before delving into conceptualizations and interpretations of the Obama Doctrine, as 
influenced and shaped by the abovementioned International Relations theoretical frameworks, it 
is important to understand Obama himself. His background and personal philosophies are 
insights into his Foreign Policy prerogatives and positions on international issues. 
 Barack Obama was born in Honolulu, Hawaii in 1961 to a black man from Kenya and a 
white woman from Kansas. Beginning a peripatetic life at the age of six, he relocated to Jakarta, 
Indonesia when his mother remarried with an Indonesian man. He returned to Hawaii a few years 
later to finish primary and secondary schools. He would go on to begin his first two years of 
27 
 
college at Occidental College in California, before transferring to Columbia University in New 
York City.25 Upon graduating with his undergraduate degree, Obama would make his first trip to 
Kenya to see his biological, yet distant, family. After working as a community organizer on the 
south side of Chicago, he attended Harvard Law School where he was elected President of the 
Harvard Law Review. While at Harvard, as the New York Times biographical profile on him puts 
it, Obama “taught three courses, the most original of which was on racism and the law, a 
historical and political seminar as much as a legal one. He refined his public speaking style. He 
was wary of noble theories, his students said. He was, rather, a contextualist, willing to look past 
legal niceties to get results.”26 Already, Barack Obama’s personal philosophy is beginning to 
formulate. One can see from his academic upbringing, he has a penchant for critically analyzing 
and judging scenarios based on a balanced, methodological approach. 
While at Harvard, he wrote his first ‘quest-for-identity’ bildungsroman autobiography: 
Dreams from My Father. His nascent love of rhetoric and of words is no more obvious than 
when he writes of his solitary escape into literature and ideas as a pursuit for the construction (or, 
reconciliation) of his variegated identities and upbringings. On page 85 of Dreams From My 
Father, he writes that while attending school in Hawaii, he “gathered up books from the library- 
Baldwin, Ellison, Hughes, Wright, DuBois,” and at night would “close the door to my 
room…and there I would sit and wrestle with words, locked in suddenly desperate argument, 
trying to reconcile the world as I’d found it with the terms of my birth.”26 Here, one can see 
Barack Obama’s internationalist upbringing converge with his ‘search for an identity,’ as well as 
his appreciation for a dialectical understanding of the perennial challenges that shape and 
construct the interpersonal relationships between peoples. Many of his pre-presidential speeches 
and remarks are peppered with his global perspectives on issues. 
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Aristotle defined rhetoric as “the ability to see what is possibly persuasive in every given 
case.” More contemporary scholars like Hausman, define rhetoric as the “the management of 
symbols to coordinate social action"; or Asante, whose definition of rhetoric is “the 
communication of ideas, values, opinions, and beliefs in an effort to elicit the approval or 
acceptance of others.” In an essay entitled “The Rhetoric of Hope and the American Dream,” 
author Deborah F. Atwater consolidates these three definitions of rhetoric in order to better 
concretize Barack Obama’s speech style at the 2004 Democratic National Convention. With his 
infusion of his internationalist background, with his emphasis on values, cultures, and norms, 
Obama clearly prenominates his foreign policy with Atwater’s termed “Rhetoric of Hope” in 
what is generally regarded as his breakthrough moment in American politics. “The Rhetoric of 
Hope,” as she defines it, is mostly persuasive: “the use of symbols to get Americans to care 
about this country, to want to believe in this country, to regain hope and faith in this country, and 
to believe that we are more alike than we are different with a common destiny and a core set of 
values.” 27 While this assertion may certainly be dubious, it raises some important ideas that will 
be discussed more extensively later.  
“Out of Many, One,” the 2004 DNC keynote address begins with Obama’s patriotic 
celebration of his personal, archetypically American, rags-to-riches/overcoming-racism story. He 
begins: “Tonight is a particular honor for me because — let’s face it — my presence on this 
stage is pretty unlikely. My father was a foreign student, born and raised in a small village in 
Kenya. He grew up herding goats, went to school in a tin-roof shack. His father — my 
grandfather — was a cook, a domestic servant to the British.”28 Highlighting his patchwork 
familial heritage was routine by the time he was elected to the Presidency. Regarding the latent 
internationalist and Constructivist traces in the address, Atwater writes that he deftly made the 
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audience, “and more importantly, the rest of the country a sense of belonging to a broader 
inclusive community.” Again, one sees Obama’s vision of a cooperative world with participatory 
nation-states as commensurable with their relations. 
His second and final book, The Audacity of Hope, was written in 2006 and contains a 
plethora of statements that would illustrate his personal philosophy and divine his eventual 
foreign policy. In the book, he defines the Democratic Party as “this idea that our communal 
values, our sense of mutual responsibility and social solidarity should also be expressed through 
our government.”29 Finally, drawing upon his experiences as a lad, he writes on page 279 that 
"Indonesia serves as a useful metaphor for the world beyond our borders - a world in which 
globalization and sectarianism, poverty and plenty, modernity and antiquity constantly collide.” 
At the end of Dreams from My Father he concludes that American law as the record of “a long-
running conversation, a nation arguing with its conscience.”  
Obviously Obama intones a vast respect toward other cultures and an understanding for a 
deeper dedication toward acknowledging the differences across borders- both “bright” and 
“blurred”- as Richard Alba termed the two types. Suffice it to say that his rhetoric is indicative of 
a Liberal (in the politico-ideological sense of the term) Progressive, one who feels that, 
generally, a government should at the very least attempt to balance the ‘public interest’ with 
‘what interests the public.’ Progressivism has sought to consolidate that which is in the best 
interest of a country through policy measures and sweeping regulations. While this may be 
extremely difficult and idealistic even to a supreme statesman, we will see that Obama’s deeper 
philosophical grounding reflects this political ideology well, and, to a certain degree, combines 
his foreign policy rhetoric of Constructivism and Liberal Internationalism with uniquely 
American philosophical cornerstones of classical American thought. 
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James T. Kloppenberg, Warren professor of American History at Harvard and a specialist 
in the intellectual history of the United States and Europe, writes that Obama’s writings and 
rhetoric are largely shaped by three unexamined themes. They are anti-foundationalism, 
historicism, and pragmatism. Kloppenberg writes: “As an anti-foundationalist, he questions the 
existence of universal truths. As a historicist, he doubts that any ideas transcend the particularity 
of time and culture. Finally, as a philosophical pragmatist he insists that all propositions, 
positions, and policies must be subjected to continuing critical scrutiny.” These overarching 
philosophical influences, he contends, are subsumed by, and manifested outright through the 
political principles of civic republicanism and deliberative democracy.29 However “pragmatic” 
Obama may be, it still does not quell the myriad of criticisms and global opprobrium regarding 
his foreign idealism. In Reading Obama: Dreams, Hopes, and the American Political Tradition, 
Kloppenberg draws attention to the Founding Fathers and thinkers that have helped shape 
Obama’s thinking. Combining civic republicanism and deliberative democracy, as the Founding 
Fathers had tried to do, results in a continuous discussion of advancing the ‘common good’ while 
simultaneously ensuring freedom. Evidently influenced by James Madison, Obama writes in The 
Audacity of Hope that the Constitution and its framework are “designed to force us into a 
conversation,” and that it engenders “a way by which we argue about our future.” This is at great 
odds with those, like Supreme Court Justice Antonin Scalia, who uphold notions of an 
intransigently “dead” Constitution whereby the meanings and language of what is actually 
written is not amorphous (and anthropogenic) over time, but rather static and unalterable. 
Kloppenberg writes that “Obama the law professor concedes that such a conception of the 
founding appeals to him because it encourages us to emphasize the contingency of the original 
document and to appreciate the contingencies that lie beneath our own invocations of high 
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principle.”30 Obama’s budding metaphysical-legal philosophy can be seen as grounded in a 
dialectical skepticism, one that accounts for changes in time, culture, and epoch. As one can see, 
this lends itself very well to both Liberal Internationalism (cooperation and regard for others’ 
viewpoints and the limiting socio-historic-politico factors that come into play in international 
relations) and Constructivism (sedulously accounting for inter-subjective meanings in the 
believed absence of universal truths across borders). 
Other philosophers Kloppenberg cites as having had an impact on Barack Obama’s 
formative years, besides the prolific Weber, Nietzsche, and Thoreau, are cultural theorist and 
anthropologist Clifford Geertz, political philosophers John Rawls and Hilary Putnam, historian 
Gordon Wood, and legal scholars Martha Minow and Cass Sunstein (the latter now an Obama 
appointee working as Administrator of the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs). 
Regarding Obama’s foreign policy, Kloppenberg cites that Obama’s doughtiness on “the 
enduring power of our ideals,” as he stated after winning the race to the White House, signaled a 
“clear repudiation of the self-conscious tough-guy realism of the preceding eight years.” Taking 
Kloppenberg’s scholarship on Barack Obama’s intellectual burgeoning very seriously, one can 
clearly see the aforementioned thinkers’ impact on Barack Obama’s foreign policy and 
international theoretical conceptions more clearly, leading to an even more extensive 
philosophical corollary: Cosmopolitanism (which will be discussed in the proceeding 
paragraphs). 
Martha Minow, in her seminal book, Making All the Difference: Inclusion, Exclusion, 
and American Law, writes that when different groups collide on certain issues, “differences” (in 
the sociological-political sense of the word) can best be resolved through “dialogue.” On page 
217 she writes: “The challenge is to maintain a steady inquiry into the interpersonal and political 
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relationships between the known and the knower; a concern for the relations between wholes and 
parts; a suspicion of abstractions, which are likely to hide under claims of universality…and a 
respect for particularity, concreteness, reflection on experience, and dialogue.” Emphasizing a 
“relational approach” to solve the “dilemmas of difference” involves “contextual judgments and 
acknowledgement of the mutual dependence of people in the construction of their identities.” 
These ideas abound in the construction of Obama’s foreign policy rhetoric and the respect he 
pays to both his own influences, and those influences’ effects on his internationalist philosophy. 
These ideas, which clearly helped shape Obama’s thinking, also open themselves up to 
vulnerability and many paradoxes haunt these ways of thinking. One example of this 
contradiction is the self-referencing act of democracy promotion and the dictation of ideals and 
values. Barack Obama often references America’s “ideals” and “values” as well as his promotion 
of international human rights (obviously constructed by what some perceive as ‘the Powerful’). 
In the typical light of Post-modernism, Obama’s “incredulity toward the meta-narrative,” as 
Jean-Françoise Lyotard penned, as well as his incredulity toward static international relations 
and social constructions, can certainly be seen through his international speeches as we will see. 
Martha Minow’s renouncement of univocal solutions to larger problems plays right into 
Obama’s own politico-philosophical pragmatism that extends itself into his dedicated efforts at 
international deliberation regarding global quagmires that, as Minow states, “resist solution by 
category.”31 
In an essay entitled “Minow’s Social-Relations Approach to Difference” by Katharine T. 
Bartlett, she draws attention to scholar William E. Connolly’s conception of “agonistic 
democracy.” This idea posits that “This ideal politics is built on a commitment to the diversity, 
the interdependency, and the contingency of being, a commitment that structures democratic 
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strife as a necessary and productive series of respectful engagements.”32 Clearly, the 
indeterminacy of social relations between peoples lends itself to how Barack Obama views his 
presidency. Looking to bridge the perceived gap between America and the rest of the world (e.g. 
us and them, the West and the Rest, the Other) Obama’s eschewal of certain phrases like “the 
War on Terror” show that he maintains an assiduous respect for the avoidance of generalities and 
absolutes.  
In his first year as a law student, Barack Obama was asked to serve as a research assistant 
for his constitutional law professor and renowned legal scholar Lawrence Tribe. Together they 
worked on an essay entitled “The Curvature of Constitutional Space: What Lawyers Can Learn 
From Modern Physics” that would eventually be published in the Harvard Law Review in 1989. 
In it, Tribe credits Barack Obama, among others, “for their analytic and research assistance.” 
“The Curvature of Constitutional Space” looks into how and why the notions of Thomas Kuhn’s 
scientific paradigmatic shifts that effect and create social relations should lend themselves to 
corresponding revisions in jurisprudence. Insightfully, Professor Tribe shows how modern 
physics transmuted scientific thought from a belief that the universe was comprised of isolated 
objects that act on one another from distances only determined by scientific laws, society and 
culture, too, are shaped by an ineluctable connectedness. And the dearth of scholarship and 
literature devoted to understanding how legality and states construct social identities and social 
relations is obvious; and shows Barack Obama’s preconceived Constructivist influences. Like 
Obama, Tribe abjures constitutional originalism for historicism, as a way to bring new ideas into 
light, under shifting paradigms, creating a “conversation” as Obama penned. Finally, the article 
draws upon the Rawlsian pragmatic “veil of ignorance” whereby, as Tribe concludes, “the 
fundamental fairness of a society is best judged by an examination of its treatment of the least 
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advantaged.”33 Many of Barack Obama’s speeches and foreign policy initiatives reflect this 
notion of “dignity promotion” as Craig Hayden suggests. “The Curvature” also makes numerous 
references to another Obama influencer Clifford Geertz. (Geertz, the vanguard of “symbolic 
anthropology” semiotically defined “culture,” in 1973, as “an historically transmitted pattern of 
meanings embodied in symbols, a system of inherited conceptions expressed in symbolic forms 
by means of which men communicate, perpetuate, and develop their knowledge about and their 
attitudes toward life.”34) Tribe, similar to Obama, eschews and conventional wisdom and 
absolutes while paying respect to differences across borders by stating: no culture can ever be 
studied in its ‘pristine’ state since the very presence of an anthropologist is bound  to  have  a  
significant impact  on  the  way  of  life  of  the people being studied.” Obama’s rhetoric and 
writings echo these very sentiments especially when he invokes anecdotal vignettes of his own 
experiences growing up as a young boy in Indonesia. In his book, James T. Kloppenberg quotes 
Geertz’ influences on Obama summarily stating: “Lawyers, Geertz wrote, must explore the 
‘social meaning of what the state has done,’ because ‘the state enacts an image of order’ that is 
coercive…it inevitably curves the space around it.” 
Barack Obama’s personal un-essentialized identity, cultural understanding, and personal 
journey through the international and legal pathways have allowed him to develop a critical and 
discerning understanding of the challenges associated with many political issues. His own 
writing and upbringing portrays an intellectual relentlessly searching for common ground with 
both sides of contentious problems. His determination to reach a Hegelian impasse on seemingly 
irreducible philosophical problems lends itself well to the rhetoric and global engagement he 
exudes through his foreign policy. Obama redoundingly displays what writer David Foster 
Wallace calls the “Democratic Spirit.” The Democratic Spirit, according to Wallace, is “one that 
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combines rigor and humility, i.e., passionate conviction plus a sedulous respect for the 
convictions of others.” 35 Even Kloppenberg likens Obama’s “knack for conflict resolution” as a 
form of chicanery. It is not surprising that Barack Obama’s internationalist and American 
pragmatism influences his thoughts on global affairs. From his earliest days as a college student, 
to his political and local ascendancies in Chicago that would eventually lead to the White House, 
Obama has carefully, which is not to say artfully, crafted a politically syncretic vision for the 
United States of America as a more thoughtful and compassionate country open to new ideas, 
policies, and motivations. Obama still regards America as a beacon on a hill, and his internal 
political activism of deliberative democracy and civic republicanism have extended into his 
actions abroad- an attempt at galvanizing and transforming abroad an infrangibly intransigent 
status quo into a more peaceful and productive ‘world of our own.’ As we will see, his 
intellectual and political tendencies may help, interpret, and analyze the rhetoric that shapes 
Obama’s foreign policy.  
 
Rhetoric 
  
In a 2010 interview for The Politic, James T. Kloppenberg was asked the following 
question: “How does he fit into the age of the sound bite?” Citing Obama’s ability to see the 
complexities of certain problems and his jettisoning of absolutisms for a more consilient 
approach, he stated- “taking into account different points of view and deep cultural differences 
among Americans” he fits “Very, very poorly.”36 While this may be an apology for Obama’s 
difficulties in navigating through the political jungle of Washington D.C., it certainly merits 
consideration nonetheless. 
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 Aristotle’s legendary aphorism in The Politics stated quite pithily: “man is by nature a 
political animal.” In the mid-twentieth century, political philosopher Hannah Arendt echoed a 
similar sentiment when she wrote that “To be political, to live in a polis, meant that everything 
was decided through words and persuasion and not through force and violence.” 
 In Communicating Politics in the Twenty-First Century, author Karen Sanders outlines 
three dimensions of communicating that demand mention as they apply to Obama’s use of 
rhetoric (the last word to be defined). 
 
That language is an articulated system of signs- syntaxis- which 
must be used correctly. 
That language is a vehicle of meaning -semantics- which implies a 
commitment to the notion that it can tell us about truth or, if 
preferred, reality. 
That language has a practical dimension- rhetoric- which is about 
knowing how to communicate in such a way that we achieve the 
desired effect in our audience. 
The last dimension is not trivial; it reflects both the character and 
style of each human being and also the fact that human beings’ 
experience of reality is not straightforward.37 
 
Barack Obama understands the preceding outline of the importance of rhetoric. On 
February 21, 2008, well into the throes of his campaign, he stated that “Words are important, 
37 
 
words matter, and the implication that they don't, I think, diminishes how important it is to speak 
to the American people directly about making America as good as its promise.” He understands 
the power and influence of rhetoric as both a tool, and in the aforementioned Geertzian fashion 
of semiotic cultural symbolism, the ability of words to create, structure, and delineate a set of 
ideals that take into account deep philosophical assumptions, save certain inherent contradictions 
in his foreign policy. To this end, there are several central tenets to Barack Obama’s foreign 
policy rhetoric that combine his assiduous drive to change America’s role and image on the 
world stage. Combining his philosophical pragmatism, his artful word-craft, and complex 
understanding of contextuality and the historical indeterminism of the American and 
international tradition- all subsumed by his own identity formation and internationalist 
upbringing, one sees that Barack Obama’s foreign policy is shaped by several salient themes. 
While none are mutually exclusive, they all help to bolster, not only the aforesaid Liberal 
Internationalist-Constructivist-Institutionalism foreign policy, but his personal intellectual 
development and outlook on life. Obama’s political onslaught of international public diplomacy 
represents both his views on global politics, and an effective way to communicate his vision.  
 
Cosmopolitanism 
 
A central, yet often unnoticed aspect of Barack Obama’s foreign policy construction and 
philosophical corollary to his domestic political understanding is his Cosmopolitanism.  
John Atkinson Hobson of Great Britain, an iconoclastic and prolific writer, journalist, 
political activist, anti-colonialist and staunch liberal of the early twentieth century, is now widely 
regarded as the preeminent founder of what David Long refers to as ‘a new liberal 
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internationalism.’ This formulated theory suggested that international relations and the world as 
a whole is shifting away from isolated individualism (or, ‘rugged individualism,’ a classic, 
American-birthed concept), as well as laissez-faire Capitalism, and instead heading toward 
greater collectivism and increased social organization. While this may collide with classic 
notions of a Liberal Internationalism that seeks to promote free trade, open markets, market 
harmonization etc., one sees that this may not be the case in fact, but rather toward a more 
participatory role by the government. Some other important assumptions in Hobson’s theory of 
twentieth century Liberal Internationalism that Barack Obama shares are human rationality and 
the resiliency of science and reason as more apt to deal with mankind’s progression. In Barack 
Obama’s inaugural address, he states that “We'll restore science to its rightful place” intimating 
that science and reason were unjustly subordinated by a more conservative federal 
administration. Hobson’s “instrumentalist approach” to science, however, brought with it an 
Obama-like air of relativism and the fallibility in the dogmatism of “pure disinterestedness and 
value-freedom in scientific investigations.” Just as Obama disabuses his philosophical 
understanding of the world from absolutes, J.A. Hobson, too, disavowed meta-narratives that 
transcended both time and frontiers.  
As mentioned before, Barack Obama’s domestic historical understanding is displayed 
when he states in his inaugural address that America must “choose our better history”- ultimately 
heeding to the dialectical historical relativism underlying many of our nation’s most persistent 
problems. Finally, and this is where Barack Obama’s Cosmopolitanism will be scrutinized more 
extensively, Hobson’s ideas divine modern day concepts of globalization. Globalization, broadly 
defined, may be regarded as the imminent worldwide integration and development of cultures, 
39 
 
markets, and political systems. Hobson’s ideas reflected the idea that “‘we both are and should 
be part of a broader community than that of the state.’ ” Hobson wrote: 
 
Internationalism, as a policy of peace and progress, demands that 
the individual feelings of goodwill which give substance to the 
smaller groupings, from family to nation, shall be so extended that 
the single citizen of England, America, Germany, France, Russia, 
shall supersede the governments of these countries as units of 
internationalism. 
 
Although Barack Obama may not fully reject a completely state-centric approach to 
international relations, as he has stated numerous times that America as a nation would be a 
leader, he certainly reflects Hobson’s position on international relations being regarded as 
organic; internationalism, he posits, is characterized by “peaceful relations of states regularized 
in intergovernmental organizations and by transnational relations of groups and individuals.” As 
Professor Long puts it simply, “the international realm is an integral part of social life and cannot 
be understood apart from it.” In Obama’s inaugural address, he states: “And so, to all the other 
peoples and governments who are watching today, from the grandest capitals to the small village 
where my father was born, know that America is a friend of each nation, and every man, woman 
and child who seeks a future of peace and dignity.” This reaching out to other nations and 
peoples signifies a stark change in Obama’s view of the world as compared with past presidents. 
As more rhetoric appears throughout his presidential tenure, it becomes clear that he believes, as 
Hobson argued, that: “everyone lives in a series of concentric circles of association which affect 
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him in general as a human being. Such are the home, the neighborhood (village or town), his 
class, his country, the world.”38  
 It is also important to conclude that Hobson was a staunch opponent of the way in which 
he regarded Cosmopolitanism: the atomization of humanity as a global society in which every 
human is an isolated individual. This is not what Barack Obama’s Cosmopolitanism is. Obama’s 
Cosmopolitanism may be viewed as a consolidation of Institutional Cosmopolitanism and 
Political Cosmopolitanism, as Richard Beardsworth defines them. The first, Institutional 
Cosmopolitanism, builds upon the Rawlsian ideas of global distributive justice. Rawls, a 
previously discussed major influence on Obama’s political thoughts and minimalist when 
addressing ideas on justice across borders, differentiated between first- and second-order 
principles of justice. This extends itself to a “global culture” he felt lays the groundwork for: 
non-aggression, the popular consent of a people to a representative government, and, at the very 
least, verbal defense of the Lockean: life, liberty, and property. Disagreeing with Rawls, but a 
good point to make here nonetheless, is that Nagel and Miller argue that international principles 
of justice can only work within a system of cooperation- i.e. NGOs, alliances. The second form, 
Political Cosmopolitanism, draws upon the renowned work of ‘cosmopolitan democracy’ by 
Danielle Archibugi and David Held. Following the philosophical foundation set forth by Jürgans 
Habermas, Archibugi and Held argue that Political Cosmopolitans (like Barack Obama) must 1. 
Define their perception of Cosmopolitanism and concretize it in the practice of democracy, 2. 
Reduce the hypocrisy of nation-states, and 3. Democracy should be practiced and promoted in a 
globalized world at as many levels of governance as possible.39 Merging with a foreign policy 
such as the Obama’s administration that promotes LICI, one can see how the themes of 
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globalization and ways in which America deals with its associated challenges (e.g. poverty, 
human rights) manifest themselves in Obama’s rhetoric.  
Barack Obama’s “A World That Stands As One” speech is the hallmark of his 
Cosmopolitanism. Addressing a large crowd at Brandenburg Gate in Berlin on July 24th, 2008, 
Obama declared: “I speak … as a fellow citizen of the world.” This statement was reminiscent of 
both John F. Kennedy’s “Ich bin ein Berliner” West Berlin speech in 1963, and Martin Luther 
King Jr.’s Riverside Church address where he stated: “I speak as a citizen of the world.” In The 
Audacity of Hope, Barack Obama writes that we live in “an era of globalization and dizzying 
technological change.” In an article by Linda F. Selzer of Penn State University, she states that 
“By drawing on his own body to develop the twin concepts of cosmopolitan 
democracy and democratic cosmopolitanism, he also contributes to the larger cultural moment's 
project of forging a revitalized cosmopolitan ethic.”40 His Berlin speech underscores almost all 
of the aforementioned philosophical underpinnings. To begin, he writes in Audacity that “We 
can try to slow globalization, but we can't stop it.” One may argue that his ideas of 
Cosmopolitanism are an attempt to Pragmatically reconcile an intertwined “Destiny” he 
references so much. “While the 20th century taught us that we share a common destiny, the 21st 
has revealed a world more intertwined than at any time in human history.” He addresses the 
crowd at Berlin declaiming again: “People of the world – look at Berlin, where a wall came 
down, a continent came together, and history proved that there is no challenge too great for a 
world that stands as one.” Referencing others as “people of the world,” Obama seeks to reiterate 
that we as human beings all belong to a somewhat abstract conception of a global community. In 
sum, Obama’s iconicism- often drawing upon his own multi-racial background, as Selzer posits, 
“Obama's understanding of cosmopolitan democracy is, therefore, one that emphasizes the 
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diversity of the nation's citizens, recognizes difference in history or present circumstance, and 
appeals to shared values and interests as regulative ideals for the nation's unrealized future.” 
Obama’s acknowledgement of the unalterable interconnectedness of global relations today 
portrays his deep understanding of the imperiling problems of modern democracy.  
According to Richard Beardswarth, Held and Archibugi, though emphasizing different 
aspects of democracy, their meta-principles of collective and individual autonomy underpin 
political responses to the interconnectedness between nations today. The five principles are (as 
written in Cosmopolitanism and International Relations):  
 
1. Moral egalitarianism (dignity of the person).  
[(As Craig Hayden suggested, notwithstanding Obama’s 
substantiation of, “dignity promotion” has been a major facet to his 
foreign policy. In Berlin, Obama rhetorically posed: “Will we 
extend our hand to the people in forgotten corners of the world 
who yearn for lives marked by dignity and opportunity?”)] 
2. Self-affection: those significantly affected by processes and 
decisions should participate in the decision-making procedures by 
which such processes are addressed and such decisions are made.  
[(One can see here this principle align itself with Barack Obama’s 
deliberative democracy influences.)] 
3. Subsidiarity: the making and implementation of decisions 
belong to the political order- municipal, national, regional, global- 
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at which both effectiveness and legitimacy are achieved together 
(see also Cabrera, 2004).  
[(One can see here can see here that this principle aligns itself with 
Obama’s Liberal Internationalist “concentric circles of association” 
that may conclude with the final allegiance, or association, being a 
supranational Institution like the UN.)] 
4. Symmetry and reciprocity: all behavior and action between 
agents (at whatever level) work on the basis of the symmetry of 
decision-makers and the reciprocity of responsibilities and duties.   
[(“Now is the time to join together, through constant cooperation, 
strong institutions, shared sacrifice, and a global commitment to 
progress, to meet the challenges of the 21st century.” We will see 
this becoming a greater aspect to Obama’s foreign policy when he 
calls upon other nations to work in concert to combat certain 
global issues.)] 
5. Sustainability: the present moral duty towards future generations 
to provide them with a planet upon which they can achieve dignity 
of life.39  
[(Befitting this principle, Obama’s remarks stated: “This is the 
moment when we must come together to save this planet. Let us 
resolve that we will not leave our children a world where the 
oceans rise and famine spreads and terrible storms devastate our 
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lands. Let us resolve that all nations - including my own - will act 
with the same seriousness of purpose as has your nation, and 
reduce the carbon we send into our atmosphere.”)] 
 
Repeatedly alluding to his own heritage, as well as drawing upon a call for, what Linda 
Selzer refers to as a “New Cosmopolitan ethic,” Obama constantly fuses his vision of the world 
into a diplomatic message that conveys the United States as more receptive, eager, and willing to 
work collaboratively with other countries, nations, and peoples. By using his own narrative and 
understanding of history, culture, and time, he is able to construct a foreign policy rhetoric of 
LICI that underscores calls for both a new beginning, and state-awareness (i.e. self-referencing 
faults, mistakes, etc.), resulting in a new American role abroad. Obama’s self-identified 
Cosmopolitanism ethic seeks to foster conversation across numerous axes, while using words to 
sensitize people to the fragile differences across borders. He applies rhetoric of proactive, 
constructive description. Questions of whether Obama’s rhetoric are the vessels on which he 
voices his ideas, visions, insights, and declarations, obsolesce when placed in the light of just his 
presence alone in front of a given audience. His personal identity- as a ‘post-ethnically’ 
internationalist ‘citizen of the world,’ bespeaks his own rhetoric. Ironically, contradictions within 
his own post-modern understanding of truths and history, aside from his personal narrative, as 
shown through his books and through the works of scholars and writers alike, had crafted an 
image and semiotic presence of Obama that symbolized more than the vision of what America 
‘should be.’ A major, yet often overlooked, component of Obama’s foreign addresses is an 
attempt at reconciling the recurrent foreign policy conundrum of is/ought. Making numerous 
references to America’s willingness to accept its faults, and yet look passed them when 
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“defending America’s interests”, contributes to the atmosphere: balanced. A compassionate yet 
resolute stance Obama’s Pragmatic Cosmopolitanism constructs. 
The next major speech that elucidates, not only his philosophical outlook and foreign 
policy framework, but the critical and symbolic reputation he engendered, was delivered in Cairo 
in June of 2009. Entitled, “A New Beginning,” this speech was arguably his most profound, 
popular, and well-received around, not only the Muslim world, but the Western one as well. 
Despite minor trepidation in several polls conducted prior to Obama’s arrival, his international 
popularity skyrocketed afterward. Statistically, based on many similar polls, George Bush’s 
popularity was scant one year prior to Obama’s arrival in the Middle East. Despite the reluctance 
on the part of many Middle Eastern nations to believe that Obama could galvanize and reshape a 
Middle Eastern perception of America’s foreign policy different than that of the entrenched, 
democracy-promoting Bush doctrine of the preceding years, Obama did change perceptions; 
albeit for a short while.  
Obama begins his Cairo speech with an emissary-like admiration, bringing with him a 
“feeling of goodwill of the American people, and a greeting of peace from Muslim communities 
in my country:  Assalaamu alaykum.” He extols Egypt as “representing the harmony between 
tradition and progress.” One may argue that, throughout his sentiments, he attempts to liken 
Egypt to America- maintaining his Cosmopolitan rhetoric of constructed self-identity, and 
change, as he promoted cooperative conversation through diplomacy- without ever stating it. In 
the Richard Rorty Pragmatist style of rhetoric, Obama lauded Egypt and America similarly- 
maintaining pride in his own country, while calling for a “new” beginning. Using his 
Constructivism foreign policy rhetoric, he combined both the Isocratic and Aristotelian rhetoric 
by lauding Egypt (in the Liberal Internationalist tradition of scientific praise and understanding).  
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As a student of history, I also know civilization's debt to Islam.  It 
was Islam -- at places like Al-Azhar -- that carried the light of 
learning through so many centuries, paving the way for Europe's 
Renaissance and Enlightenment.  It was innovation in Muslim 
communities; it was innovation in Muslim communities that 
developed the order of algebra; our magnetic compass and tools of 
navigation; our mastery of pens and printing; our understanding 
of how disease spreads and how it can be healed.  Islamic culture 
has given us majestic arches and soaring spires; timeless poetry 
and cherished music; elegant calligraphy and places of peaceful 
contemplation.  And throughout history, Islam has demonstrated 
through words and deeds the possibilities of religious tolerance 
and racial equality.  
  
 He doesn’t just celebrate Islamic traditions, he states that humanity is indebted to Islam’s 
secular achievements, and even credits the progress of science and mathematics (-arguably, 
Reason) with the overarching theme of a factual, yet overlooked global interconnectedness. By 
crediting and praising typically Western ideals and values demonstrably shown through Islamic 
reformation, like “religious tolerance” and “racial equality,” he creates an Americanized form of 
appreciation toward the Middle East. While referencing the hostile and tenuous history between 
Islam and the West, he advisedly eschews the term “War on Terror,” and reaffirms this 
avoidance by declaring “that America is not -- and never will be -- at war with Islam.” This 
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certainly speaks to the implied view that the Bush administration considered Islam to be 
inherently hostile to the West. While many around the world believed that the Bush 
administration conflated “Terror” with Muslims and Islam. His dedication to his LICI foreign 
policy promulgates a redefined image of America, yet still dedicated to the espousal of a 
democratic cosmopolitanism, and all articulated through his being a “citizen of the world.” In 
defending America as being a new form of cosmopolitan democracy- one that is both conscious 
and cooperative with other nations, he touts this as being the exemplar for democratic 
cosmopolitanism globally, by stating: affirming his commitment to "governments that reflect the 
will of the people," he states his “unyielding belief that all people yearn for certain things: the 
ability to speak your mind and have a say in how you are governed, confidence in the rule of law 
and the equal administration of justice, government that is transparent and doesn't steal from the 
people, the freedom to live as you choose.” Intertwining his own personal narrative with the 
narrative of America, he is able to reconstruct an image of America and the role of a new 
Cosmopolitan ethic whereby America is the leader and defender of such a premise.  
Throughout his 2008 campaign, Obama’s political rhetoric, his racial hybridity, and 
unique philosophical and educational background, all contributed to the stark distinction between 
Obama and every other president America has ever elected. Because he did not fit the typical 
mold of politician (racially, ethnically, and patronymically), it was difficult for many 
commentators and writers to pin him down to a single political Doctrine. By using a form of 
rhetoric that appealed to peoples of all nations, he was able to concretize a foreign policy rhetoric 
that draws upon his education, his politico-philosophical thought, and his reinvigorated LICI 
foreign policy. Remaking America as a cosmopolitan democracy, he espouses calls on other 
nations to embrace democratic cosmopolitanism- not because it is the most idealistic form of 
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political thought, but rather because it is the most practical form of contemporary thought in a 
systemically globalizing world. Because he feels that globalization is unavoidable, this line of 
thinking he calls for in his Cosmopolitan rhetorical diplomacy asks other nations to be conscious 
of the world themselves. Obviously, one can see that he does not feel that isolationism is the 
proper response, but rather (as a Liberal Internationalist would think) a fraternal bond between 
humanity. He states: 40, 41 
We have learned from recent experience that when a financial 
system weakens in one country, prosperity is hurt everywhere. 
When a new flu infects one human being, all are at risk. When one 
nation pursues a nuclear weapon, the risk of nuclear attack rises 
for all nations. When violent extremists operate in one stretch of 
mountains, people are endangered across an ocean. When 
innocents in Bosnia and Darfur are slaughtered, that is a stain on 
our collective conscience.  
 By associating a global responsibility with concurrent problems like terrorism, illnesses, 
and economic disaster, he turns political responsibility into a moral one. Avoiding material 
interests and obligations, he keeps his rhetoric abstract and states that all human beings share a 
“collective conscience.” He concludes with: “That is what it means to share this world in the 
twenty-first century. That is the responsibility we have to one another as human beings.” By 
claiming that we are all citizens of the world, Obama envisages a new way for America to act in 
the world, but also respectfully requests that other nations, too, step up to the task because the 
world, as he sees it, ‘is all in this together.’ Again, this is not because it is Obama’s quixotic 
foreign policy, but rather a carefully deliberated, modernly Pragmatic way of addressing 
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challenges that are both real and divisive. In his Cairo speech, though, he also asserts to the 
world what America expects of it in return (i.e. symmetry and reciprocity- see above) for 
becoming a more cooperative, and friendly, ally to other nations:  “We must say openly the 
things we hold in our hearts and that too often are said only behind closed doors. There must be 
sustained effort to listen to each other, to learn from each other, to respect one another, and to 
seek common ground.” Obama conveys a desire for constructive change while seeking to utilize 
his mediation abilities toward a dialectical discourse in order to find unapparent answers to major 
questions in international affairs. 
 These speeches show, as other scholars have noted, that Obama permits himself the 
words and rhetoric applicable to a foreign policy based on LICI. Discourse, dialogue, and appeal 
are all apart of the rhetoric that goes into Obama’s vision of a new American role in the world. 
As Carlin Romano of the University of Pennsylvania states, “Over all, though, Obama's most 
singular philosophical breakthrough was to artfully project the cosmopolitan idea that the U.S. 
president must care about non-Americans… to an extraordinary extent, Obama effectively 
announced that the U.S. president, because of the United States' effect on and involvement with 
the rest of the world, must think of other global citizens as constituents...” Referring to Obama as 
America’s first and only “Philosopher in Chief,” Romano successfully captures the essence of 
Obama’s vision, the ensuing foreign policy rhetoric that attempts to expound on it. He concludes 
that “Obama, like no president before him, has notified the rest of the world that the United 
States will continue to export its philosophy, ethos, and political theory -- but through 
conversation, not declamation, seeking free adoption, not grudging acquiescence.”41 Unlike his 
predecessor who is often associated with Liberal Internationalism and making the world safe for 
democracy by any means necessary, Obama seeks to rhetorically promote the ideas of abstract 
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concepts like freedom, representation, liberties, non-violence, through ethical appeals to Reason, 
thought, discourse, ideas, and humanitarian-like dignity promotion.  
Soft-Power and Global Engagement 
 This is the part of the paper that, while still focusing on Obama’s rhetoric that highlights 
and underscore the LICI influenced foreign policy the Obama administration has promulgated, 
this section will also seek to incorporate how certain policy initiatives have also substantiated 
these IR philosophies. 
 Joseph R. Nye coined the term “soft power” in an essay published in Foreign Policy in 
1990. At the time, the Soviet Union had fallen and many scholars were attempting to make sense 
of the state of the world and the U.S.’ position in it. Francis Fukuyama wrote about “the end of 
history” in which he concluded that the primacy of liberal capitalist democracies would ascend 
as the primary establishmentarianism form of governmental organization.  Realists who 
propounded Statecraft and Realpolitik policies began scrambling to make sense of the new global 
power dynamic and hegemonic superiority of the United States. Even Henry Kissinger in 1975, 
before the fall of the Berlin Wall, stated that “we are entering a new era. Old international 
patterns are crumbling... The world has become interdependent in economics, in 
communications, in human aspirations.” In his aforementioned 2008 speech at Brandenburg Gate 
“A World That Stands as One,” Obama echoed a similar sentiment: 
  
This is the moment when every nation in Europe must have the 
chance to choose its own tomorrow free from the shadows of 
yesterday. In this century, we need a strong European Union that 
deepens the security and prosperity of this continent, while 
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extending a hand abroad. In this century – in this city of all cities – 
we must reject the Cold War mind-set of the past, and resolve to 
work with Russia when we can, to stand up for our values when we 
must, and to seek a partnership that extends across this entire 
continent.11 
 Clearly Obama’s conception of world politics differs greatly than that of many 
intellectual predecessors like Henry Kissinger and Francis Fukuyama who extolled the fall of the 
Berlin Wall and the subsequent fall of the U.S.S.R. as a supreme vindication of the impossibility 
of a Communist state and its paternalistic accompaniment. While some, like Samuel Huntington, 
who in 1993 foresaw the unipolarity of the United States as predating a future “Clash of 
Civilizations” where most future conflicts would be a result of cultural conflicts, Obama’s view 
of the world today may be regarded as not unipolar, but rather as a world community of coequal 
nations that could and should work in concert with one another to combat the ills of 
globalization. (“People of the world – look at Berlin, where a wall came down, a continent came 
together, and history proved that there is no challenge too great for a world that stands as one.”). 
This clearly is a starkly different interpretation of twentieth-century history. Obama states:  
In this new world, such dangerous currents have swept along 
faster than our efforts to contain them. That is why we cannot 
afford to be divided. No one nation, no matter how large or 
powerful, can defeat such challenges alone. None of us can deny 
these threats, or escape responsibility in meeting them. Yet, in the 
absence of Soviet tanks and a terrible wall, it has become easy to 
forget this truth. And if we’re honest with each other, we know that 
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sometimes, on both sides of the Atlantic, we have drifted apart, and 
forgotten our shared destiny. 
 
 Using his rhetoric to try and sway people across the world in order to promote dignity, 
ideals, and ideas, his foreign policy whether it be on purpose or inadvertent, incorporates notions 
and identifications with soft power. Joseph Nye wrote in that same article, “In general, power is 
becoming less transferable, less coercive, and less tangible.  Modern trends and changes in 
political issues are having significant effects on the nature of power and the resources that 
produce it. Co-optive power-getting others to want what you want-and soft power resources-
cultural attraction, ideology, and international institutions-are not new… Various trends today 
are making co-optive behavior and soft power resources relatively more important.” With hard 
power being less associated with liberalism, and focused more on military strength, economic 
might, and governmental coercion, soft power plays a role more conducive to and relying greatly 
upon public diplomacy.42 In 2008, Joseph Nye wrote that “it is difficult to think of any single act 
that would do more to restore America’s soft power than the election of Obama to the 
presidency.” Although he wrote this in 2008, his sentiment did not stay with him up to this time. 
Having extolled the Obama administration for engaging in what Hillary Clinton referred to as a 
new “smart power” strategy- incorporating both hard and soft power resources to advance 
American ideals- Nye soon began lamenting that current budget shortfalls and policy initiatives 
the Obama administration promoted did not live up to all the rhetoric. However, the changing 
climate in Congress was not enough to deter the Obama administration’s soft power promotion.43 
 In 2008 Clarence Lusane wrote that “The emphasis on “soft power” articulated often by 
Obama is seen as a salve to heal the militarism, unilateralism, and bellicosity of the Bush years.” 
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In 2007, Obama’s emphasis on soft power maintained notions of his nascent LICI foreign policy 
construction along with its Cosmopolitanism corollary. Lusane states that while Obama may wax 
more to the left than any of his predecessors, and Hillary Clinton, his focus on Third World 
development, human rights, poverty reduction, and climate change gives attention to what 
Lusane characterizes as “second-order effects”; namely, human rights. This, in his opinion, not 
only sways from the Bush administrations paltry focus on these issues, but rather re-brands and 
redefines U.S. hegemony in a post-Soviet world. This is where Obama’s Constructivist foreign 
policy initiatives take shape. By articulating through rhetoric and policy initiatives, what 
America is and ought to be, he is able to re-envision a role for America on the international 
stage. 44 
His 2007 Foreign Policy missive “Renewing American Leadership” articulates the tone 
with which he seeks to shape his foreign policy. The subtitle states: “Common Security for our 
Common Humanity.” Again, notions of a global community where ideas, and values, all 
transported linguistically to its respective citizens of the world come into play as Obama 
formulates his LICI foreign policy framework. Referencing throughout his piece Frankin D. 
Roosevelt, Harry Truman, and John F. Kennedy, he lauds the historic circumstances and 
conditions that gave rise to distinctly soft-power programs like F.D.R.’s “Four Freedoms,” the 
Marshall Plan, and the Peace Corps and the Alliance for Progress. All of which, with paired 
military enhancements, he credits with helping to “secure the peace and well-being of nations 
around the world.” He then begins by extrapolating on his title with the topic sentence: “Today, 
we are again called to provide visionary leadership.” Using this phrase, he makes it clear that 
“visionary leadership” is both symbolic and metaphorical. He further goes on to appease his 
more hawkish detractors, stating that only through renewed and reinvested alliances abroad can 
54 
 
we (as a global community) defeat ‘murderously nihilistic’ terrorists, and combat “rogue states” 
who “could challenge both America and the international foundation of liberal democracy.” This 
is a very bold assertion. This statement, and the subsequent ones, vividly shapes the way in 
which Barack Obama views the world and America’s role in it. Referring to the Bush 
administration’s policy actions and rhetoric as “conventional thinking of the past,” Obama’s 
adumbrated conclusion for which he calls for a new “visionary leadership” is simply: “the world 
has lost trust in our purposes and our principles.” While he may not have been ready to “cede 
leadership,” Obama articulates very clearly, the role for America in world affairs, summarizing 
perfectly his Liberal Internationalist Constructivism Institutionalism foreign policy. 
 Such leadership demands that we retrieve a fundamental 
insight of Roosevelt, Truman, and Kennedy-one that is truer now 
than ever before: the security and well-being of each and every 
American depend on the security and well-being of those who live 
beyond our borders. The mission of the United States is to provide 
global leader ship grounded in the understanding that the world 
shares a common security and a common humanity.  
The American moment is not over, but it must be seized 
anew. To see American power in terminal decline is to ignore 
America's great promise and historic purpose in the world…45 
  
 Evading declarative, indeterminate prerogatives such as ‘American interests,’ as seen 
throughout the Bush years, ideas of ‘unilateralism,’ ‘America-first,’ ‘American Exceptionalism’ 
(in the neo-/Conservative aspect of the term implying Superiority), and nationalism (which, 
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arguably, subsumes all the prior) are largely avoided, if not completely absent. For further proof 
that he, at the very least, does not share the familiar understanding of “American 
Exceptionalism,” one must turn to a response he gave in Strasbourg, France on April 4th, 2009. 
When asked if he believed in “American Exceptionalism,” he replied: “I believe in American 
exceptionalism, just as I suspect that the Brits believe in British exceptionalism and the Greeks 
believe in Greek exceptionalism.” At a G20 summit in London in the same year, Obama also 
stated: “We exercise our leadership best when we are listening . . . when we lead by example, 
when we show some element of humility and recognize that we may not always have the best 
answer.” However, he did qualify his now infamous remark on “American Exceptionalism” by 
stating: “I see no contradiction between believing that America has a continued extraordinary 
role in leading the world towards peace and prosperity and recognizing that that leadership is 
incumbent, depends on, our ability to create partnerships because we can't solve these problems 
alone.”46 
 While scholars like Lusane contend that while ineffective policies, incompetence, and 
arrogance, all played a role in the Bush administration’s foreign policy- with little to no emphasis 
placed on soft power-promoting tendencies (e.g. an almost complete disregard to international 
institutions like the Geneva Convention and the U.N.)- the intrinsic goals of America to promote 
and perpetuate hegemony and “neo-liberal economic dictates,” would ultimately rely upon the 
subordination of soft-power to hard power. Obviously Bush and Obama’s notions of U.S. 
primacy, or hegemony, would clash, one thing is clear: they promote the same things but differ 
on the means of achieving them. Where Bush sought to make the world safe for liberal 
democracy through nation building, militarized conflict, and democratic interventionism, Obama 
seeks to make the world safe for democracy through idea promotion, global engagement, and 
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soft power (i.e. the marketing of U.S. ideals to the world while leading through example). Soft 
power is a central tenet to a foreign policy based around the principles of LICI. 
 (Obviously, there is a growing body of literature on the incalculable contradictions and 
arguments put forth by Realists and political writers who claim that Obama has failed in terms of 
advancing soft power in favor of a more hard-line approach to international conflicts and 
challenges. What should be argued here is that, while there have certainly been speeches and 
incidents where Obama’s administration has acted unilaterally- i.e. 2009 troop surge in 
Afghanistan, North Waziristan drone strikes that killed two American ‘citizens,’ and even the 
killing of Osama bin-Laden, one can make the defense that this happened for three reasons. The 
first being that he was acting in national self-defense which is commensurate with any 
administration irrespective of foreign policy, political ideology, or doctrine. That, owing to the 
dearth of national security information pertaining to the imminence of 
threats/violence/fanaticism/extremism/etc. by the average American citizen and even the most 
privy scholars, privacy takes primacy. Essentially, one must cede that the President is in a 
position to weigh and calculate certain prospective actions commensurate with top-level 
information. This can also be interpreted as a morally Pragmatic move- that an administration’s 
actions are not presented to Congress is a result of an administration’s cost-benefit analysis that 
ultimately favors perceived beneficial outcomes for the U.S.  
The second, which is more applicable to his speeches, is political pandering and detractor 
appeasement. Upon winning the Nobel Peace prize for example, many people around the world 
may have viewed Obama as dovish, and possibly, passive. Obviously not wanting to appear 
plaintive or weak, Obama’s Nobel speech prize was dedicated to the defense of “just wars” as a 
catalyst to peace. Suffice it to say many people were bemused by his choice of rhetoric at this 
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time. Again, this paper’s focus is not an indictment of the gaps between Obama’s rhetoric and 
policies, for which many today continue to impugn him, but rather an attempt at understanding 
the foreign policy Obama envisions for the United States. In fact, Mark Lagon, International 
Relations and Security Chair at Georgetown University’s Master of Science in Foreign Program, 
has written that Obama’s inefficacy in his soft power approach is not so much the act itself, but 
rather the doubt of “America’s moral standing to project it.)47 
 While much of his Presidential and campaign rhetoric focused heavily on the use of soft 
power in restoring America’s image, rebuilding alliances, and changing peoples’ minds about 
America, many of his enacted policies were very reliant upon soft power. Rhetoric and speeches 
artfully crafted to win over peoples’ ‘hearts and minds’ may only lead a President so far. Many 
of his administration’s workings with the State Department portray, at the very least, a strong 
desire to engage with the world on a level largely different than that of his predecessors.  
In his May 2010 National Security Strategy, Obama prefaces the grand document by 
reemphasizing the principles that will eventually shape the rhetoric and policies of his LICI 
based foreign policy doctrine. He begins by stating, in his Constructivist tradition, that 
historically speaking, America has always “risen to meet- and shape- moments of transition.” He 
then goes on to state that present challenges like global terrorism, globalization, economic 
tumult, and international warfare have become so systemic that, although America should lead 
by example, the interconnectedness of the democratic international political order essentially 
precludes unilateralism. (“The burdens of a young century cannot fall on America’s shoulders 
alone.”). He also mentions promoting: human rights, human dignity, global hunger/poverty 
alleviation, science and research, and global education. Stating that our “shared interests” with 
other countries around the world cannot be bolstered by hard power and military might alone, he 
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states: “Our security also depends upon diplomats who can act in every corner of the world…and 
work seamlessly with other countries.” This emphasis on soft power will be seen extrapolated 
through his policy initiatives, as well as the way in which he conducts his foreign travels. It 
should also be mentioned that Obama’s National Security Strategy emphasizes the 
“strengthening,” “respect,” and “enforcing” of “international norms” over fourteen different 
times throughout the entire document.48 
As writer Craig Hayden posits, the Obama administration’s popularity was perceived as 
an implicit call for a reinvigorated foreign policy replete with newly installed public diplomacy 
mechanisms. His domestic and international popularity shows that Obama the candidate was 
deeply interested in being a president who, using “reparative overtures would convey that the 
United States respects the conventions and norms of the international community.” Clearly 
Obama had many qualms with the Bush administration’s dearth of public diplomacy tools and 
strategies. In a 2008 Washington post article, it was stated that Obama renounced the Bush 
Doctrine of hard power, and instead would make it clear that Obama would, at the very least, try 
to “increase foreign assistance.” Hayden himself states that “the perceived qualities of an Obama 
administration, its attitudes towards international norms, the rule of law, and respect for diversity 
and cultural history represent assets for the administration in its attempts to achieve policy 
objectives.” An arduous and ambitious plan indeed, Obama’s reanimated vision for a foreign 
policy based more on communication was, in fact, bolstered by several salient policies. But, as 
Hayden reminds us, Presidential rhetoric provides a foundation for definitional goals and 
persuasive ends in a campaign of public engagement—it is not necessarily the campaign in 
itself.” 
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Prior to his inauguration, Obama’s initial plans for a new public diplomacy strategy 
included the creation of “America Houses” in the Arab world, complete with “Internet libraries, 
English lessons and stories about Muslims in America.” There was also a proposal for a $2 
billion Global Education Fund to provide primary education to under-funded peoples around the 
world. While these proposals may not have come to fruition, the Obama administration managed 
to create the Global Engagement Directive to “leverage diplomacy, communications, 
international development” directly from the White House. This was not without detractors, 
however. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Admiral Michael Mullen warned in an 
adumbrated declaration that, “To put it simply, we need to worry a lot less about how to 
communicate our actions and much more about what our actions communicate.”7 Soft power has 
its discontents, but this speaks to a larger problem that Obama has, and will continue to face over 
the next year or so. This will be addressed at the end of the essay.    
 Abe Greenwald presents the connection between Joseph Nye’s definition of soft power 
and its relation to Obama’s vision of the power schemas present in today’s world. At the end of 
the Cold War, as scholars and academics were seeking to make sense of international politics- 
articulating a role and purpose for America in a unipolar world, Joseph Nye wrote: “Increasingly, 
the issues today do not pit one state against another; instead, they are issues in which all states 
try to control nonstate transnational actors. The solutions to many current issues of transnational 
interdependence will require collective action and international cooperation.” In 2009 at a U.N. 
General Assembly meeting, Obama echoed a similar sentiment: In an era when our destiny is 
shared, power is no longer a zero-sum game. “No one nation can or should try to dominate 
another nation. No world order that elevates one nation or group of people over another will 
succeed. No balance of power among nations will hold. The traditional division between nations 
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of the south and north makes no sense in an interconnected world. Nor do alignments of nations 
rooted in the cleavages of a long gone Cold War.”49 
 Obama’s nascent attempt at emphasizing soft power strategies (self-evidently) should not 
be misconstrued with a replacement of, or, at the very least, a de-emphasis of hard power and 
military might. That assertion would be counterfactual and very misleading. However, there have 
been several cases where Obama has both attempted to, and accomplished policies that have 
worked against military build up, and have highlighted soft power concretely and rhetorically. 
The most salient of these examples (since his inauguration) have been (in no specific order): 
ordering the closing of Guantanamo Bay detention center; abjuring the phrase “War on Terror;” 
ending both wars in Iraq and Afghanistan; New START (Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty) with 
Russia; creation of the interagency Atrocities Prevention Board; prohibition of torture; 
established a new “U.S.-China Strategic and Economic Dialogue”; Free Trade Agreements with 
Columbia, Panama, and South Korea; and engagement with U.S. adversaries (i.e. Iran). While 
some of these may clearly overlap with hard power interests, many of them seek to recreate new 
ways of interacting with the international sphere and the United States. 
 While many commentators have been reluctant to define the “Obama Doctrine,” Foreign 
Policy’s David Rothkopf wrote- adroitly capturing the Obama administrations new global 
engagement strategy- The Obama Doctrine, while grounded in the idea that we must exhaust 
every other means of advancing our national interest, is responding to the lessons of a different 
unpopular war, in this case, Iraq. It is a reaction against the use of "overwhelming force" to 
achieve rather narrow (not to mention dubious) goals. It is an antidote to "shock and awe," "three 
trillion dollar wars" and unilateral conventional invasions if they can possibly be avoided.” 50 In 
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2009, the Nobel Committee awarded Barack Obama the Peace Prize with a press release that 
attributed his selection  
 
“…For his extraordinary efforts to strengthen international 
diplomacy and cooperation between peoples. The Committee has 
attached special importance to Obama's vision of and work for a 
world without nuclear weapons. Obama has as President created a 
new climate in international politics. Multilateral diplomacy has 
regained a central position, with emphasis on the role that the 
United Nations and other international institutions can play. 
Dialogue and negotiations are preferred as instruments for 
resolving even the most difficult international conflicts. The vision 
of a world free from nuclear arms has powerfully stimulated 
disarmament and arms control negotiations. Thanks to Obama's 
initiative, the USA is now playing a more constructive role in 
meeting the great climatic challenges the world is confronting. 
Democracy and human rights are to be strengthened. 
Only very rarely has a person to the same extent as Obama 
captured the world's attention and given its people hope for a 
better future. His diplomacy is founded in the concept that those 
who are to lead the world must do so on the basis of values and 
attitudes that are shared by the majority of the world's population. 
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For 108 years, the Norwegian Nobel Committee has sought to 
stimulate precisely that international policy and those attitudes for 
which Obama is now the world's leading spokesman. The 
Committee endorses Obama's appeal that "Now is the time for all 
of us to take our share of responsibility for a global response to 
global challenges”51 
 
Whether or not he deserved it aside, his dedication to public diplomacy and leveraging a 
new role for America in the world was certainly well received. Obama’s personal narrative, as 
well as his Pragmatism and Cosmopolitanism, have manifested themselves into a LICI foreign 
policy that, at least in the beginning, reform American international maneuverings. In dealing 
with other nations, Obama seeks to treat other allied nations with mutual respect and assurance, 
through the vessel of public diplomacy. Obama looks past the United States to be the sole 
spreader of democracy and liberal values. Although his administration’s attempts at becoming a 
more willing and engaging international actor, it was certainly not without detractors.  
Amitai Etzioni, in 2010, wrote that Obama’s substantive theme was summed up in one of 
his inaugural address lines: "To those who cling to power through corruption and deceit and the 
silencing of dissent, know that you are on the wrong side of history, but that we will extend a 
hand if you are willing to unclench your fist." He contends that what such a statement implied 
was a spinelessness that, in effect, stated “as long as [American adversaries] forgo violence, 
whether or not you democratize or honor human rights, we will consider you a member in good 
standing of the international community.” While Obama does tend to garner criticisms from 
many for being perceived as weak toward adversarial nations, he has nonetheless repeatedly 
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stated that American interests are not to be subordinated to aggressor nations. Etzioni also posits 
that Obama jettisons Samuel P. Huntington’s theory of a “clash of civilizations” for a lower 
baseline for “good citizenship in the global community: non-violence.” Non-violence plays a 
major role in Obama’s rhetoric, like in the Cairo speech. While writing about the change in tone 
and rhetoric, Etzioni states: “President Obama himself has been highly successful in changing 
the way the United States defines its position in the world and redefines what it expects from 
others…I am referring not to the change in tone (from assertive and unilateral to conciliatory and 
cooperative) but to a major change in substance-the case the United States is making about its 
role in the world and about the evolving global architecture it envisions.” Echoing the 
aforementioned criticism of misguided emphasis on communication rather than action, Etzioni 
thinks that Obama fails in terms of better articulating value-judgments.52 
To conclude this section, and highlight Obama’s LICI foreign policy with respect to 
global engagement and soft power, this extract taken from a West Point Commencement address 
captures perfectly the combination of hard and soft power- i.e. “smart power,” Obama has tended 
to articulate throughout his tenure: 
 
So we have to shape an international order that can meet the 
challenges of our generation. We will be steadfast in strengthening 
those old alliances that have served us so well, including those 
who will serve by your side in Afghanistan and around the globe. 
As influence extends to more countries and capitals, we also have 
to build new partnerships, and shape stronger international 
standards and institutions.  
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This engagement is not an end in itself. The international order we 
seek is one that can resolve the challenges of our times -- 
countering violent extremism and insurgency; stopping the spread 
of nuclear weapons and securing nuclear materials; combating a 
changing climate and sustaining global growth; helping countries 
feed themselves and care for their sick; preventing conflict and 
healing wounds. If we are successful in these tasks, that will lessen 
conflicts around the world. It will be supportive of our efforts by 
our military to secure our country. 53 
 
  “Shape,” “international standards,” “engagement,” “helping”- all of these words portray 
an idea of an America that is deferential, extensive, and self-reflective in its scope and use of 
power. By proclaiming (to the United States’ armed forces no less) that one of the major 
responsibilities of the U.S. is to provide humanitarian relief and aid, and further, that these are 
mere tools through which peace will be fostered, ethically bifurcates from those of George W. 
Bush. Whether or not these goals were carried out, and to what extent they did or did not fail, is 
not the issue at heart. The issue at heart becomes one of ethical choice. The commander-in-chief, 
as the civilian leader of the army, makes pertinent and crucial decisions regarding foreign policy 
and understanding such a person’s background makes it easier to comprehend the way in which 
they view both the world and America’s role in that world. Being a ‘willing partner,’ or even 
mentioning those types of words evinces a certain emotional atmosphere in publics and other 
international leaders of both greater expectations and reformation. The main point of contention 
however, is the gap between rhetoric and policy. While this is nothing new, the artfully skilled 
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orator that Obama is may make the challenge of changing attitudes and policies, or winning the 
‘hearts and minds’ of others, disillusioning. What may explain the current protests from both the 
left and right amongst today’s youth, may not be as ideological as one is first led to believe, but 
more of a supreme disenfranchisement, or even disconnect between the political establishment 
and the younger generations that was thought to be non-existent with the election of Obama. 
That Obama has rhetorically emphasized a new vision of America- one that seeks to increase soft 
power (albeit bolstered by hard power), and maintain better respect for allies whose interests 
coincide with those of the U.S. 
 
Multilateralism 
 
 Heavily based on both rhetoric and policy, the Obama Doctrine relies upon 
multilateralism to help aid in the fight against global challenges. Upon entering office, Obama 
was confronted with two major issues deeply ingrained in American politics as a result of the 
prior administration. Suffice it to say that each and every President in the history of the United 
States has inherited many problems stemming from a previous administration; however, 
compared to incumbents, newly inaugurated Presidents begin with a carte blanche through 
which they are able to appoint officials as well as other members of a cabinet to form a 
government commensurate with the goals and aims of the campaign. Although this is the way in 
which an accountable government should work, many presidents adhere to their party lines, 
ideology, to name a few, and unexpected circumstances. As Donald Rumsfeld, Secretary of 
Defense in the Bush administration made famous, there are three types of dangers regarding 
national security and foreign policy: “known-knowns” (the threats that an administration’s 
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intelligence is aware of), “known-unknowns” (the threats that may occur based on past 
experience and reasonable/feasible potentialities), and “unknown-unknowns” (actions and threats 
beyond the scope of conceptual prevention and understanding). Every President (one hopes) 
seeks to avoid all possible areas of American destruction like attacks at home, American troops 
killed abroad, international terrorist attacks and other such events. However, regarding foreign 
policy, many events outside the direct control of an administration are left to be handled at the 
discretion of the governing administration. Keeping in line with Obama’s LICI foreign policy, 
and its emphasis on rationality, international decisions are weighed and applied so that the 
potential costs anticipated become as internecine as possible. The Obama administration’s most 
salient and timely example of an international conundrum that left it beholden to straightforward 
decision-making and American force application was the NATO-led Libyan intervention.  
 Underscoring Obama’s foreign policy, thus far, I have outlined that rhetorically and 
policy-wise, his espousal of Liberal Internationalist values, the cultural boundaries that delimit a 
populace, and the diplomatic tools necessary to, at least, attempt to convey and communicate a 
new Cosmopolitan ethic- subsequently elucidating America’s new role in this world. His own 
personal narrative becomes infused and extrapolative when he articulates his view of a 
patchwork world interconnected in the fight against pandemic challenges like globalization, 
terrorism, and climate change, to name a few. As many have already suggested, in a world where 
America promotes the sovereignty of a polity to establish and create a functional government, 
this may, and certainly has, led to the construction of unrepresentative governments and 
totalitarian regimes. While America may have been in the business of explicit regime change in 
the Middle East, especially regarding Iraq and Afghanistan under the Bush administration, 
Obama’s approach to the self-dismantling and internal demise of the Arab uprisings in Tunisia, 
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Egypt and Libya was largely non-committal in scope, until intervention was determined to be 
humanitarian in character, deemed appropriate by international institutions. This is where Obama 
may best be viewed as an “institutionalist” (in the Robert Keohane sense of the word). As 
mentioned before, international collaboration need not imply univocal motives, causes, or 
determinants. Obama’s belated rhetorical acknowledgement toward the Arab uprisings that took 
place in Algeria, Bahrain, Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, and Syria, among many others, received a lot of 
domestic and international opprobrium ultimately until he eventually addressed the revolutions, 
thus ceasing to “dither” and declaratively commit the United States to a stance regarding regime 
change within those countries. 
 At his Nobel acceptance ceremony, Obama spoke of “just wars”- ones in which violent 
means are necessary to achieve reconciliation between idealism and pragmatism. Beginning his 
speech with calls for a stronger international engagement, he lauded the Marshall Plan, U.N., and 
other “mechanisms to govern the waging of war, treaties to protect human rights, prevent 
genocide, and restrict the most dangerous weapons.” Putting all notions of pacifism to rest, 
without exhorting indiscriminate warfare, he states:  
 
I face the world as it is and cannot stand idle in the face of threats 
to the American people…For make no mistake: evil does exist in 
the world. A non-violent movement could not have halted Hitler's 
armies. Negotiations cannot convince al-Qaeda's leaders to lay 
down their arms. To say that force is sometimes necessary is not a 
call to cynicism--it is a recognition of history, the imperfections of 
man and the limits of reason. 
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 Finally, and probably the most explicit call for multilateralism within the speech comes 
when he states that “...if we want a lasting peace, then the words of the international community 
must mean something. Those regimes that break the rules must be held accountable. Sanctions 
must exact a real price. Intransigence must be met with increased pressure--and such pressure 
only exists when the world stands together as one.” Through this declaration he not only 
valorizes the maneuverings of multilateral institutionalism, but justifies its utilization as being 
the best available opportunity in the wake of global threats that confound more than just the 
United States. While the Nobel Prize decoration was seen by many as both presumptuous and 
premature, it also makes perfect sense that this display of approbation for “multilateral 
diplomacy,” strengthening “international diplomacy and cooperation,” and the “emphasis on the 
role that the United Nations and other international institutions can play” came from Sweden- a 
Scandinavian country.54  Historically, the Scandinavian countries have been largely multilateral 
and collaborative politically, dating back to the Treaty of Roskilde. 
Egypt’s first major demonstration came on January 25th, 2011 when a social network-
coordinated protest witnessed thousands taking to the streets of Cairo demanding the immediate 
resignation of then-President Hosni Mubarak. It was only after precipitous growth and 
international attention that President Obama responded to the uprising on February 10th 
announcing that “The Egyptian government must put forward a credible, concrete and 
unequivocal path toward genuine democracy, and they have not yet seized that opportunity.” 
Declarative and unambiguous, the Obama administration verbally supported the uproarious 
demand of the Egyptian populace for governmental reform and accountability.55 
 Amid the growing unrest around other Arab countries early in 2011, the first major 
protest in Libya took place on February 16th, 2011 after the arrest of a human rights activist. The 
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anti-Gaddafi protesters were attacked by fellow pro-governmental protesters. As protests started 
becoming violent, and eventually reaching the capital city of Tripoli, the U.N. Security Council 
voted in approval of Resolution 1973 on March 18th, implementing an immediate ceasefire, a no-
fly zone over Libya, and corresponding air strikes on Gaddafi’s forces. Facing increasing 
pressure to address the nation following the U.S.’ nascent operations in Libya, Obama delivered 
a speech addressing what American involvement in the NATO-led Libyan intervention would 
entail. At the National Defense University in Washington D.C., he begins the justification for 
intervention based on being “in our interests,” calling Gaddafi a “tyrant” who squandered wealth, 
ruled despotically, killed Americans, and attacked his own people. Referring to this issue as 
antagonistic to American interests, Obama stated that the mutual promulgation of violence in 
Libya between Gaddafi and the protesters had put American “interests and values at risk.” 
  
For generations, the United States of America has played a unique 
role as an anchor of global security and as an advocate for human 
freedom.  Mindful of the risks and costs of military action, we are 
naturally reluctant to use force to solve the world’s many 
challenges.  But when our interests and values are at stake, we 
have a responsibility to act.  That’s what happened in Libya over 
the course of these last six weeks.  
 Not that this would be the first time a U.S. President would refer to a military operation 
as acting in our interests, Obama goes on to phrase this issue as being a humanitarian cause. 
Claiming that direct and unilateral intervention would not yield the most auspicious outcomes, 
Obama injects that a military mission to include regime change would be a mistake. To be blunt, 
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we went down that road in Iraq.” He states that “We had a unique ability to stop that violence:  
an international mandate for action, a broad coalition prepared to join us, the support of Arab 
countries, and a plea for help from the Libyan people themselves.” As a President who 
vociferously adulates the role multilateralism plays, Obama, while understanding the fine line 
between cultural relativism and human rights, decided to act in spreading Western values and 
interests. He appeals to emotion when he states that “To brush aside America’s responsibility as 
a leader and – more profoundly– our responsibilities to our fellow human beings under such 
circumstances would have been a betrayal of who we are.  Some nations may be able to turn a 
blind eye to atrocities in other countries.  The United States of America is different.  And as 
President, I refused to wait for the images of slaughter and mass graves before taking action.”56 
Again, his rhetoric here reverts back to an outstretched hand willing and morally responsible for 
helping other civilizations in need. While Gaddafi may have posed a threat larger than what the 
general public is led to believe (due to the preclusion of top secret administrative information 
etc.), this is in effect, a strategy akin to that of George W. Bush, albeit to a much lesser degree.  
 Phrases like “responsibilities to our fellow human beings” and “human freedom” again, 
harkens back to notions of moral egalitarianism and Cosmopolitanism. Obama tends to view the 
world as populated by interconnected peoples with shared destinies, common interests, and the 
rest of the Liberal Internationalist roil. Mentioning the term “coalition” ten times throughout the 
address, Obama’s highlighting of institutionalism is most displayed most clearly when he says 
that when “confronted by this brutal repression and a looming humanitarian crisis” the U.S. was 
able to galvanize the “international community” (a phrase he uses five times), but would “play a 
supporting role.” This contradiction in rhetoric would come to serve as a major sticking point for 
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the media and other analysts who greatly derided the Obama administration for not taking 
prominence in the effort, and his resultant ‘dithering.’  
 One commentator sardonically called the international Libyan intervention reluctantly not 
led (prima facie) by the United States as the “Professor’s War.” This “model of international 
cooperation” included but was not limited to “All the necessary paperwork. Arab League 
backing. A Security Council resolution.” Written sarcastically, it still contains factual evidence- 
ideology aside.57 
 On October 20th, 2010, news reports surface alerting the world of Gaddafi’s death. 
Immediately thereafter, writers around the world began speculating anew ideas about the 
“Obama Doctrine.” Heralding his multilateralism and international cooperation, the Left began 
to commend his resoluteness not to deploy ground troops but instead rely on airstrikes. The Right 
chastised him for his resoluteness not to act unilaterally (or receive Congressional sanction, 
citing the 1973 War Powers Act). Regardless, whatever ideological interpretations were 
engendered by the final outcome, an important point to make here is how we may interpret 
Obama’s rhetoric on international institutionalism.  
 In The National Interest, Richard K. Betts’ April 2011 review of John Ikenberry’s then-
new book “Institutional Imperialism” provides important points that really direct the current 
debate regarding Obama’s foreign policy practice. Referring to George W. Bush’s unpopular 
perception of being “the embodiment of brazen international-order-ruining unilateralism,” 
Ikenberry reveals that neither Clinton, nor Obama are very different. “What unites rather than 
differentiates Bush, Clinton and Obama is not the desire for multilateralism but the unwillingness 
to subordinate the substance of policy to the form of its implementation. For most statesmen, 
multilateralism is a means; in Liberal Leviathan it is an end in itself.” A generally negative 
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review, Betts excoriates Ikenberry for ‘tiptoeing’ “around what is really at issue: the permission 
slip” to act, and for stating that Western countries like the United States should aim to avoid 
“interventions or brute exercises of force that end up . . . making the liberal order less 
legitimate.” To this, Betts rhetorically questions: Does that mean refraining from a successful 
humanitarian intervention that saves thousands of lives if it is not endorsed by some multilateral 
organ? Or that invading Iraq is wrong if done without a permission slip from the UN but okay if 
we have one? That we should or should not intervene in Darfur, Libya or Congo?” 
 John Ikenberry’s conceit (which may in fact be an expansion of Fukuyama’s “The End of 
History” idea) that the ascension of a global, liberal order for which America is the ‘supreme 
legitimate authority’ is a side effect of America’s international hegemony. The world’s 
Leviathan- the United States- “arising out of power politics yet generating peaceful and 
profitable cooperation, shaping and managing a system of international institutions, norms and 
rules according to liberal principles. This global order is for the benefit of all, but the United 
States has a special place of privilege, ruling in a fashion, yet subject to the rules itself.” 
Ikenberry posits that the U.S., while still adhering to “international norms” can actually “lead 
through rules.”58 
 In an article in Commentary Magazine, authors Douglas J. Feith and Seth Cropsley write 
that Obama’s foreign policy doctrine is largely “animated” by two encompassing ideas:   
 
“The first is that America’s role in world affairs for more than a 
century has been, more often than not, aggressive rather than 
constrained, wasteful rather than communal, and arrogant in 
promoting democracy, despite our own democratic shortcomings. 
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Accordingly, America has much to apologize for, including failure 
to understand others, refusal to defer sufficiently to others, 
selfishness in pursuing U.S. interests as opposed to global 
interests, and showing far too much concern for U.S. sovereignty, 
independence, and freedom of action. The second idea is that 
multilateral institutions offer the best hope for restraining U.S. 
power and moderating our national assertiveness.”59 
 In an article entitled “The Consequentialist: How the Arab Spring remade Obama’s 
foreign policy,” Ryan Lizza of The New Yorker wrote in May that the Obama Doctrine that 
appeared to be forming was a syncretic admission of American leadership, American decline, 
and American revulsion around the world: “Leading from behind.” Although now the phrase’s 
origins are contested (Obama stated on his most recent appearance on the Jay Leno show that it 
was “a phrase the media picked up on”; while Lizza still maintains that it was “one of [Obama’s] 
advisors), nevertheless, it represents a profound shift in the Obama foreign policy that has come 
to define his presidency over the past three years.60 
After the death of Gaddafi, Obama delivered a five minute address from the Rose Garden 
of the White House during which he lauded the Gaddafi’s ousting, and offered an adumbrated 
message to the Libyan people and their burgeoning government. Halfway through, Obama states: 
“We’re under no illusions -- Libya will travel a long and winding road to full democracy. There 
will be difficult days ahead. But the United States, together with the international community, is 
committed to the Libyan people. You have won your revolution. And now, we will be a partner 
as you forge a future that provides dignity, freedom and opportunity.” Obama commends the 
“international community” for working together to help bring down an authoritarian regime. 
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Valorizing the Arab youth around the world, Obama reflects on the aforementioned values- 
dignity, representation, human rights, etc.- that he has always (at least) rhetorically emphasized. 
Throughout the address, he applauds the “coalition” of NATO allies and Arab states for 
collectively defeating and championing Western values, ideas, and humanitarian action. He 
states that “working in Libya with friends and allies, we’ve demonstrated what collective action 
can achieve in the 21st century.”61 
David Bosco’s journal article “Course Corrections: The Obama Administration at the 
United Nations” highlights the Obama administration’s change and continuity with one of the 
world’s most salient international institutions. This article offers a prodigious list of the 
numerous reforms and differences in policy toward international institutions as compared with 
those of the Bush administration. At Obama’s first UN General Assembly address, Obama spoke 
of a ‘reengagement’ with the UN, and was heralded even before then by then-UN Secretary-
General Ban Ki-moon for ‘looking at the world the same way we do.’ Bosco claims that the 
Obama administration has seen the UN “more as a tool than as a rehabilitation project” as 
compared with the Bush administration. This elucidates the Obama administration’s willingness 
to work with and accept the UN’s mandates and decision making processes. However, even 
Bosco points out that while the U.S. throughout the Obama presidency has acted unilaterally 
regarding certain renegade enemies like bin Laden- often relying upon a broad but vague 
doctrine of self-defense rather than specific Security Council authorization as the legal basis for 
these operations,” on international humanitarian crises like Libya, the Obama administration has 
sought the UNSC’s unambiguous permission.62 
(Plus, as was argued above, the decision to go after militantly nihilistic human beings 
who are undyingly committed to the indeterminate destruction of innocent human beings is not a 
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partisan, or policy-based, position. It is a pragmatic and necessary moral-ethical choice. To claim 
that the killing of an Osama bin Laden was a ‘good’ or ‘bad’ thing, or a ‘hawkish’ or 
‘murderous’ plot, is to ultimately fail to see the Evil he represented to the world. Preposterous 
arrogations claiming that Obama is a ‘war hawk,’ or ‘failing to live up to the expectations 
bequeathed unto him by the international community not to act without international and public 
approval’ are not just intellectually dishonest, but dangerous, and need no further explanation 
here. One hopes that any U.S. President, when given the clear, defined opportunity to expunge 
the world of a murderous villain, would carry out that procedure proudly and unabashedly- 
paying absolutely no attention to ‘public opinion.’) 
Obama also presided over and chaired for the first time in American history a Security 
Council meeting. There he brought America into a self-reflective light regarding nuclear 
proliferation and disarmament. Obama also sought to pay off the arrears that accumulated in the 
second term of the Bush presidency. With regards to another international institution, the 
International Criminal Court, the Obama administration, while still domestically constrained, has 
sought a more participative and reformative role inside the organization. United States-led UN 
sanctions toward Iran and North Korea, while another staple of continuity from the previous 
presidency, represent a committed institutionalist approach to which Obama and his 
administration have inveterately displayed. 
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Summary of Capstone Project 
 
 Every U.S. President has maintained a set of policies toward the international sphere. 
Historically, America has run the gamut of foreign policy prescriptions like The Monroe 
Doctrine, the Good Neighbor Policy, Isolationism, Containment, and Détente to name a few. 
Many Presidents of the past have had their foreign policy prescriptions coined as a ‘Doctrine,’ 
like the “Truman Doctrine” or the “Reagan Doctrine.” This paper seeks to analyze, interpret, and 
conceptualize the Obama Doctrine as evidenced through President Obama’s rhetoric. By 
analyzing his speeches, addresses, writings, and education, his foreign policy aligns itself with 
three International Relations theoretical frameworks, substantiated further by several 
subcategories. Essentially, this paper seeks to formulate Barack Obama’s understanding of three 
fundamentally exigent questions: Where are we in the world? What should we do? How should 
we do it? 
In 2008 Barack Obama was elected the President of the United States. Entering a position 
that was regarded with great unpopularity, Obama inherited a spate of problems that he 
campaigned on reforming, and the public sought to address (e.g. unilateralism, disregard for the 
international community, etc.). Credited for his articulate and fluid oration, Obama’s rhetoric 
provides insight into the way in which he views the world, and what America’s role should be in 
this world. This thesis analyzes Obama’s major campaign speeches, book passages, foreign 
policy missives, international speeches, and national addresses in order to conceptualize the 
Obama Doctrine. Diverging greatly from a Realist interpretation (another school of International 
Relations thought that stresses power politics and the primacy of nation-states, among other 
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tenets) the Obama administration has tried harder to reach out and gain a stronger foothold in the 
global arena.  
This paper’s contends that Obama’s foreign policy, as rhetorically evidenced (and 
substantiated further by his policies) is that his foreign policy prescription is based on the three 
International Relations theoretical frameworks: Liberal Internationalism, Constructivism, and 
Institutionalism (LICI). While all three of these philosophies are not mutually exclusive, they do 
contain specific assumptions and criteria that distinguish each of them. When writing about what 
Obama’s foreign policy agenda is, many scholars and political scientists have conceded that 
there is none, or if it does exist, it is amorphous and not worth defining. Analyzing Obama’s 
rhetoric shows that his administration does commit itself to a definable foreign policy, and that 
he is committed to certain principles (whether or not his administration carries them out is not 
the focus of this paper).  
The paper beings with an introduction designed to introduce the reader to many domestic 
and international interpretations of both Obama’s presidential entrance and Bush’s leave. 
Avoiding commentary, the introduction attempts to capture both public opinion at the 
atmosphere with which Obama carried into the White House. The paper then extrapolates on its 
purpose before three introductory paragraphs on Liberal Internationalism, Constructivism, and 
Institutionalism. Each attempts to succinctly explain the core set of values and beliefs each 
maintains, and how they would manifest themselves in practice. Following a chart of how each 
of the I.R. theories overlap and the intersections created by the rhetoric. Before explaining how 
rhetoric is defined and how Obama uses it to advance his Doctrine, an investigation of Obama’s 
philosophical rearing and educational upbringing provides a foundation for his intellectual 
prowess, providing for a more illustrative interpretation of his rhetoric afterward. 
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The next major section is Cosmopolitanism. As a philosophical school of thought, Obama 
portrays Cosmopolitan-based ideas in his rhetoric that shape his vision of the world. Drawing 
upon current and previous policy scholars, this section seeks to unearth an overlooked 
philosophical corollary to Obama’s intellectual development. As a self-referred “citizen of the 
world,” Obama repeatedly calls for a new ethic that calls for greater responsibilities on many in 
positions of power and capability. Constantly claiming that everyone in the world has a shared 
destiny, many of his detractors fail to see this aspect of Obama’s personal philosophy and instead 
they mischaracterize him as “post-American.”  
This paper also contends that Obama’s LICI foreign policy, and its reflective rhetoric, 
seek to reconcile normativity, description, and performativity. Liberal Internationalism- the 
normative (relating to an ideal standard or abstract model) has a certain set of values and belief 
systems consonant and dissonant with Constructivism. Constructivism- the descriptive, is largely 
the way in which Obama interprets the world through cultural difference, personal narrative 
personification, and historical analysis/interpretation. Institutionalism- the performative, is how 
Obama views America should conduct its interest-promotion and global politics. All three of 
these I.R. theories overlap, but produce several thematic consistencies Obama employs 
throughout his rhetoric. After establishing that these three frameworks are what instructs 
Obama’s foreign policy, the paper goes on to provide rhetorical evidence shown through several 
subcategories. 
The analysis shows the influences growing up internationally, attending Columbia 
University and Harvard Law School, as well as working as a community organizer have had on 
his perspective. His younger background shows that he was influenced by Pragmatism and 
Progressivism, two political philosophies that remained with him into his presidential tenure. The 
91 
 
paper then outlines the following themes that best exemplify Obama’s LICI foreign policy: 
Cosmopolitanism, Soft power and global engagement, and multilateralism. Throughout many of 
his speeches and other public gestures, Obama tends to make remarks that subsume the 
subcategories, thus justifying and supporting the argument that his foreign policy is made up of 
the three aforementioned frameworks.  
Throughout the paper, I reiterate that Obama may be regarded as neither a war hawk, nor 
dove. That he shares more with President George W. Bush than many would care to believe. The 
major changes Obama has made for the United States, I argue, are based on achieving a more 
cooperative world that addresses universal problems as collaboratively as possible. This claim is 
put forth devoid of value-judgments- such are for the reader to conclude.   
 This paper- one hopes- leaves the reader with questions they may answer after reading it. 
Has Obama’s vision of the world taken hold? How effective has Obama’s articulation of 
American values/ideas/power been translated? And what are their effects? Also, is Obama’s 
understanding of the United States unique in any way (if at all). I purposely avoid these 
questions because I was mostly concerned with understanding a president who constantly 
confounds many scholars. By proffering my own interpretation of Barack Obama’s foreign 
policy conception and the ways he has articulated them inters deeper philosophical and political 
questions and problems. Today, questions of U.S. hegemony, or international primacy, are best 
answered directly without any sort of obfuscation. Does America have any responsibility to the 
outside world? If so, what does this responsibility entail? At this moment, I could not think of 
questions timelier, more important, and more overlooked.  
 
